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Material for the Proceedings, including syllabi, meeting and professional announcements, scholarships and fellowships should be sent to the Proceedings editors, Daniel Gutierrez at dgutierrez@ipsonet.org and Yingjie Wu at yingjiewu@ipsonet.org

Image caption: The Bank Building, Dupont Circle, NW, Washington, D.C. (1369 Connecticut Ave., N.W.)

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CURRICULUM CONCERNS AND THE PROCEEDINGS

The reluctance of learned societies to publish curriculum materials in their journals is a strange curiosity. This may owe something to the relentless pursuit of citation listings and so is understandable, but it ignores the need of teachers to have ideas for the classroom that arise out of research. It does point up the way through the years that research and teaching have been separate, despite frequent breast beating about the value of their needed integration in the academy.

PSO keenly appreciates the way in which research gets priority in the university sweepstakes, but has always insisted that teaching materials are equally important. The contributors to this issue are all top scholars who certainly have substantial research credentials, and they also have sterling reputations as mentors and classroom figures. Professor Dror has a unique status as he was a contributor to PSO publications more than 60 years ago; he has retained his interest in PSO all those years, offering valuable advice and being always willing to lend a hand. We have been honored to publish his advice in his book with our PSO house Westphalia Press *For Rulers: Priming Political Leaders for Saving Humanity from Itself*. The press announcement says:

“According to Dror, the prevailing form of politics is obsolete. Instead, he argues urgently for a new type of political leader – “Homo Sapiens Governors” – willing and able to fulfill the daunting mission to save humanity from itself.

Recognizing that the tyrannical status quo will try to prevent essential transformations, Dror predicts new crises making what is still unthinkable clearly compelling – and that humankind will have to choose: learn rapidly to survive and thrive, or perish.

Yehezkel Dror is professor emeritus at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Recognized as a founder of modern policy studies, he integrates multi-disciplinary scholarship with extensive personal experience as a global advisor into a novel paradigm on alternative evolutionary futures of humanity – as shaped by fateful choices humanity has never before faced.”

We want to place on permanent record our appreciation of his many contributions to PSO and to the community of scholars, and note his generosity with his time. He is exemplary, as are all the contributors to this issue. They illustrate the maxim that if you want something done, ask a busy person.

Speaking of the PSO and its contributions and traditions over the years, our cover picture shows the historic bank building in Dupont Circle where PSO now occupies the entire fourth floor. We had happy years at the American Political Science Association building just a

couple short blocks nearby, and have been glad to continue our association with this special part of Washington. We consider ourselves fortunate to be involved in all sorts of change brought about by technology but at the same time to be custodians of a remarkable past. The names are a drum roll of distinguished savants in the best sense.

Paul Rich President

Policy Studies Organization and Westphalia Press

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Note: For search engine optimization purposes, keywords are extracted from the syllabi and listed below, followed by the corresponding Chinese translation.

Keywords: Policy making, American politics, national policy, policy process, congressional history, conflict, statecraft, policy planning, political leadership, governance, syllabus, book chapter.

关键词: 决策, 美国政治, 国家政策, 政策过程, 国会历史, 冲突, 治国术, 政策规划, 政治领导力, 治理, 教学大纲, 书籍章节

NATIONAL POLICYMAKING (PS 0210)

Instructor: Dr. James R. Alexander

Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown



PS 0210 is an elective freshman/sophomore level course in American politics. It fulfills a general education requirement as a content course in the Social Sciences if you also complete PS 0206, 0302, or 0501. This course is a core introductory course in the American politics/public policy section of the political science program and its parallel program in Secondary Education/Social Studies certification. It is also an accepted elective in the Society & Civics and General WOKs. All materials related to this course are accessible through Canvas.

OBJECTIVES OF THE COURSE. Even in a time of complex foreign engagements, economic volatility, enlarged deficits and debt, and very intense partisanship, as aspiring political analysts we should not abandon our critical interest in a substantive discussion of national policy. The question before us is whether constructive and thoughtful analysis of national policy and the policymaking process is even possible when factions within the Congress seem intent on intensifying and solidifying partisan polarization for ideological and/or campaigning reasons rather than to seriously engage in developing, executing, or overseeing any substantive federal policies. The resistance to federal activism goes way back to the anti-federalist period for true policy reasons, but today resistance seems perfunctory and purposely provocative. In fact, we experienced three ‘government shutdowns’ during the last administration when its party controlled all the institutions of government.

Despite that, we can make sense of the federal policy process since its dynamic has been rather consistent and continuous since the mid-19th century. Therefore, it is possible to apply a thoughtful, historically-based analysis to federal programs and how they have evolved to the present day, providing us with a firm foundation for evaluating policy and politics in any future Congresses. The focus of this course will therefore be on policymaking as a process rather than a set of specific outcomes – how it happened rather than what happened. We will explore both the legal/statutory and the political dynamics of the policy and budgetary processes, particularly the roles played by the offices of the President, the Treasury, Management and Budget (OMB), federal agencies (like the Pentagon, Interior or Homeland Security), the Congress and its respective committees and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). It is

critical that we also discuss these processes in historical context - their evolution and current nuances - and consider modern-era calls for reforming the political process. So, this is a background course, pure and simple. At times, it will be a slog and take patience. We will start with the presumption that you are generally familiar with the processes and structures of American national government but have little understanding of specific policy issues or the current budgetary debate.

RELEVANCE OF THE COURSE. Background perspective provided by this course is important for the study of any aspect of the national policymaking process, including the Presidency (PS 1215), the Congress (PS 1214), the federal administration of policy (PS 1245), or American foreign policy (PS 1515). It is also critical for any student interested in pursuing graduate study in American politics, American political history, public law, public administration, or policy analysis, or considering a career in or related to the public sector - as attested to by the number of Pitt-Johnstown graduates who have gone off in those directions.

EXAMINATIONS AND PAPER ASSIGNMENTS. There will be three examinations during the semester: one on basic definitions of policy terms and concepts and two involving broader essays on executive and legislative roles. Each exam will count for 25% of your final course grade and will be based on a distributed study guide. You will also be required to write a one-page, single-spaced review of several recent articles related to budgetary politics (counting 5%) and to complete a legislative tracking assignment (worth 20%).

REQUIRED READINGS. Two texts are required, both available as used paperback copies from the usual online sources (e.g. Amazon) and also available as free online **EBRARY** texts through the University of Pittsburgh's Library System (ULS). While the latter source is certainly cheaper, my experience is that students work more efficiently with texts if they have tangible copies they can highlight and underline. The books are:

~ Allen Schick, *THE FEDERAL BUDGET; POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS* (rev. 3rd edition Brookings pb).

~ Sheldon Pollack, *WAR, REVENUE, AND STATE BUILDING* (Cornell pb).

COURSE OUTLINE

Section I. The Role of the Executive in the federal policy process. This section introduces you to the basics of how national policy is formulated, debated and executed by the Executive Branch. This requires a "cold bath" exposure to the language of federal policy (budget terminology) and the standard federal policymaking cycle, as well as the diverse and interdependent roles played by the main players: the President and the EOP, the Treasury, federal agencies, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). This section is designed to give you a basic understanding of the structural and procedural dynamics of the federal budget process enough to participate knowledgably in the political debate, especially as it heated up during President Obama's last two years with a Republican-controlled 114th Congress, and became super-heated in the 115th-117th Congresses under the Trump and Biden

administrations. We will then be able to make some projections regarding the current 118th Congress as well, focusing particularly on constitutional mandates and statutory deadlines that the previous Republican administration and Congress had difficulty addressing.

Required reading:

Schick, THE FEDERAL BUDGET, chapters [2], 4-5, 7-10.

Moe, "The Politicized Presidency."

Brownstein, "The Anxious Generation."

Phillips, "The Long Story of the U.S. Debt, from 1790 to 2011."

Kohut, "Debt and Deficit: A Public Opinion Dilemma."

Stolberg and McIntyre, "A Federal Budget Crisis Months in the Planning."

- **Short review essay due in class on Tuesday January 30, 2024.**
- **Exam on budget terminology – Tuesday February 6, 2024.**
- **Exam on executive roles – Thursday March 7, 2024.**

Section II. Congressional Responsibilities in the Federal Policy Process. This section broadens our discussion to include in the budgetary process in the Congress which, constitutionally and in reality, is where policy is determined. We will provide an overview of the historical evolution of Congressional structures of policy making, such as Congressional committees, and the roles of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and General Accountability Office (GAO). This type of background is critical to understanding anything that goes on in Congress. We will also discuss the normal patterns, cycles and political "rituals" of the process, and examine perennial policy-based issues such as 'uncontrollable' federal spending, spending and debt ceilings, balanced budget amendments, and the rhetoric that surrounds each. While these are general policy issues, their debate is most often framed in partisan terms (usually as winners and losers) but these issues are recurring, common to most national governments. Finally, we will place emphasis on developing an historical perspective on these dynamics and how those were reflected in recent debates in Congress, the 2020 Presidential and 2022 midterm election campaigns, the drama over 'Obamacare,' border security, tax cuts for 'the rich' or for 'the middle class,' COVID stimulus packages, and the Infrastructure Act, not to mention the fragility of the Republican caucus in the House and pervasive cable news/pundit commentary.

Required readings:

Schick, THE FEDERAL BUDGET, chapters 2-3, 6, 11.

Pollack, WAR, REVENUE, AND STATE BUILDING.

Ornstein, "The Politics of the Deficit."

Schick, "Budgeting for Growth."

Samuelson, "Great Expectations."

Davis, "The Rule That Broke the Senate."

- **Legislative tracking assignment – Thursday April 16, 2024.**

- **Exam on legislative roles – Thursday April 25, 2024 at 9:00 am** (during final exam week).

CONGRESS IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORY

David R. Mayhew, Sterling Professor of Political Science Emeritus at Yale University

Content of course. There are three segments:

--**Generalities** (weeks 2 through 7). Political scientists accent certain topics in addressing congressional history: elections, districts, gridlock, productivity, ideology, polarization. Each week's reading packet walks these topics through a span of history.

--**Policy making** (weeks 8 through 10). Tackled here are Congress's participation in thirteen major policy impulses that have invested the U.S. and relevant peer countries starting in the 1790s.

--**Conflict** (weeks 11 through 13). Often, Congress accommodates or takes part in extreme, dramatic conflicts that erupt in the U.S. separation-of-powers system. Addressed here via narrative works are three instances of major conflict between the presidency and Congress during the last century, plus a glance at strongman populism.

Mechanics of course. This is a reading and discussion seminar. It will not accommodate senior essays or long research papers. There is a substantial reading requirement each week.

--**Requirements for all students:** Attend classes, do the required reading, be ready to take part in class discussions, and write a series of five comment papers three-to-five pages in length that address the required reading. Papers are due no later than the start of a class covering the relevant material—a strict requirement. Two of these five papers should be written before the fall midterm date. Submission of each paper to david.mayhew@yale.edu online during a pre-class Tuesday evening is recommended.

--Within these bounds, students may choose which weeks to focus on for writing papers. The average weekly reading assignment during the bulk of the course is 100 or so pages. But the page-count soars for the November 15 and 29 meetings of the course. Those weeks take up conflict between institutions, which can entail contingency, competitive tactical moves, drama, and a riveted public. Hence a need for narrative, which happily makes for a bedtime kind of reading.

--**Requirements for graduate students.** Graduate students taking cross-listed courses need to perform extra befitting their more advanced training. Hence the following. A graduate enrollee should satisfy the above requirements and also write a five-or-more-pages paper wrestling with the content and implications of any three of the following pieces: Autor or Kiewiet/Udell in the Elections week, Wawro/Schickler in the Gridlock week, Ehrlich in the Policy 1 week (find the full journal article), Jeong in the Policy 2 week, Ikenberry/Skocpol in Policy 2 week, Felbermayr in the Policy 3 week, Guriev/Papaioannou in the Populism week. Paper due at the start of the semester's final-exam period.

--**Grading:** 70% for comment papers, 30% for class participation. No midterm or final exams. All comment papers will be marked up and returned ASAP after they are submitted.

--**Access to readings.** Except for two books, all the required readings, and many of the suggested readings, will be available as files on CANVAS.

--Availability of the books. Purchase of two is recommended. Total price at Amazon's posting is roughly \$90. Any royalties accruing to the instructor from the second item listed below (a total of roughly \$60) are offset by personal costs of staging the course. The two books at the Yale Bookstore:

Frances Lee, Insecure Majorities

David Mayhew, The Imprint of Congress

--Prerequisites to take the seminar. Formally none, although a basic AP grasp of U.S. political history would help immensely. A passion for that subject is recommended. Majors in any discipline are free to apply.

--Screens. No laptops or phones in class except for students who need accessibility, or for hunts for information immediately useful in class discussions.

--Accommodations. Students with disabilities are welcome and will be accommodated.

--Credit. Thanks to the Henry Koerner Center for supporting this seminar.

---Tips on writing the comment papers. In general, apply your mind to a week's readings. Ask yourself, "What do I make of this stuff?" Some questions that come to mind might be: How does this material jibe with what I thought before taking this course based on my secondary education, previous college courses, previous reading or rumination, etc.? What's new here? What is left out? Are these interpretations believable? Why so or not so? What are their implications for thinking about the U.S. separation-of-powers system, politics or policymaking today, how things evolve, etc.? Do political or policy "eras" exist? These questions aren't meant to be exhaustive. No doubt there are other good ones. And don't try to tackle a lot of questions at once. Pick a good theme that affords a coherent paper. In writing a paper, dwell on as much of a week's reading list as makes sense. Always address the reading somehow. In the weeks of the course featuring the Imprint of Congress book, always take a shot at the week's lead-off material from that book.

--On the design of the U.S. Constitution. Much has happened since the Constitution was written and adopted nearly a quarter of a millennium ago: a nationwide country, a party system, the end of slavery, the Civil War, industrial capitalism, the welfare state, a national bureaucracy, civil rights, a geared-up presidency, universal suffrage (more or less), showdown presidential elections, not to mention American international hegemony (for a while, anyway), and on and on. A late-18th-century product, the American Constitution looks odd in international comparison. Flurries of subsequent parliamentary systems arising elsewhere have differed in design from the American system as have most presidential systems elsewhere. Yet, for better or worse, many basic features of the American design of 1787 have stuck. It is interesting to scope back to the animation that backstopped these features. Fear of the mischievousness of politicians and publics ranked high in the minds of the constitutional generation, as seen at least in the essays by the famed merchandisers of the new system, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, in The Federalist papers. These folks were peddlers of pessimism. And they were formidable wordsmiths. Salted throughout this syllabus, in italics, are certain quotations pointing to that pessimism and fear evident in

the late eighteenth century. These brief words can serve as cue-cards to The Federalist as well as DNA keys to the institutions discussed therein.

All the reading assignments below are required, unless they are suggested or just for graduate students.

AUGUST 30 - ORGANIZATION MEETING

SEPTEMBER 6 – ELECTIONS: SETTING THE TABLE ON CAPITOL HILL. Some food for thought. How can we apportion among the systemic causes of election results, the contents of campaigns, and the post-hoc judgments about what an election meant in considering how elections figure in American politics and life? How do these explanatory ingredients pour into the behavior of a freshly elected Congresses? In light of these considerations, how does the politics of the last decade or so stack up?

Required:

David R. Mayhew, “Two Centuries of Presidential Elections,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 52:2 (June 2022), 393-410. A review essay addressing the University Press of Kansas’s series of 24 books on individual presidential elections starting in 1796. Patterns. Revisionisms. General themes plus peculiarities.

David R. Mayhew, “Incumbency Advantage in Presidential Elections: The Historical Record,” Political Science Quarterly 123:2 (Summer 2008), 201-28. From George Washington through 2004. How to update this piece? Adding the four elections since 2004 tweaks the piece’s summary numbers appearing on page 368 to read 22-11 (the White House in-party’s win-loss rate with an incumbent running) and 11-13 (the in-party’s win-loss rate in open-seat elections).

One-page chart on U.S. House elections: “The Curse of Holding the White House”

Suggested:

Enrico Cantoni, “Strict ID Laws Don’t Stop Voters: Evidence from a U.S. Nationwide Panel, 2008-2018,” National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) working paper 25522, online May 2021. Industrial-strength analysis. “Using a difference-in-difference design on a 1.6-billion-observations dataset, 2008-2018, we find that the laws have no negative effect on registration or turnout, overall or for any group defined by race, gender, age, or party affiliation.”

Jesse Yoder et al., “How Did Absentee Voting Affect the 2020 U.S. Election?” Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), working paper 21-011, March 2021. More industrial-strength analysis. “The 2020 U.S. election saw high turnout, a huge increase in absentee voting, and brought unified Democratic control at the federal level—yet, contrary to conventional wisdom, these facts do not imply that vote-by-mail increased turnout or had partisan effects.”

Nate Cohn, “Trump’s Drag on Republicans Quantified: A Five-Point Penalty,” New York Times, November 16, 2022. The MAGA penalty that figured in the 2022 House midterms.

GRAD: D. Roderick Kiewiet & Michael Udell, “Twenty-Five Years After Kramer: An Assessment of Economic Retrospective Voting Based Upon Improved Estimates of Income and Unemployment,” Economics and Politics 10:3 (November 1998), 219-248. A basic econometric times-series analysis. This is where to look to see how the economy impinged on U.S. House elections during a full century starting in the 1890s.

GRAD: David Autor et al., “Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure,” American Economic Review 110:10 (2020), 3139-3183. A new brand of analysis. Variation over space rather than time. Across U.S. counties, the electoral effects of exposure to the U.S. opening up of trade with China after 2000.

The Federalist. Madison F52: “*As it is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common interest with the people; so it is particularly essential, that [the House] should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy, by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured.... The liberties of the people can be in no danger from biennial elections.*” Madison F57: “*Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode of their elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power, [the House incumbents] will be compelled to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from which they were raised; there for ever to remain, unless a faithful discharge of their trust shall have established their title to a renewal of it.*”

SEPTEMBER 13 – PARTISAN BALANCE. The Partisan Balance chapter assigned here needs to be read carefully. Be aware of the difference between a median and a mean. Keep aware of the distinction between whether a district or a state elects a D or an R rep, and what its underlying partisan/ideological complexion is. Think Joe Manchin. See this piece as an exercise in measurement. Some various thought material: What do these patterns say about current-day politics? Look carefully at the 2016 and 2020 results in the “New charts” file: Is all this generalizing going kablooey what with the country’s current drift toward metros versus boonies? Does the 0.0% reading in the southwest corner of chart #2 cry out for a game

theory interpretation? As for the Florida experience, to what degree does it generalize to the U.S. House level?

Required:

David R. Mayhew, "The Electoral Bases," chapter 1 in Mayhew, Partisan Balance (2011). The nationwide presidential popular vote split, the Electoral College, the House, and the Senate.

New charts. This file updates the tables at pages 19 and 23 in Partisan Balance in order to include the 2012, 2016, and 2020 elections.

Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, "Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures," Quarterly Journal of Political Science 8 (2013), 239-269. Does cities-versus-countryside differentiation cause a pro-Republican bias in U.S. legislative representation? Yes. At least, it has done until very recently. This piece focusing on the state of Florida offers an exquisite workout of that intuition of bias as of the 21st century.

Suggested:

Nathaniel Rakich & Elena Mejia, "Did Redistricting Cost Democrats the House?" Fivethirtyeight, December 1, 2022. This addresses 2022. Probably not, these authors say, but it is hard to tell. House district lines had gotten changed at least a little bit in 429 of 435 cases. Some states gained districts, some lost them. Parties, legislatures, governors, commissions, and courts vied confusingly for control of the districting decisions. The districting rules across the states are a nightmarishly complicated mix. Strategic behavior, as in members deciding whether to retire if confronted by new lines, cannot be metricized. Partisan designs backfired in New York and Ohio. It was a mess.

Michael Peress & Yangzi Zhao, "How Many Seats in Congress Is Control of Redistricting Worth?" Legislative Studies Quarterly 45:3 (July 2020), 433-68. This piece is a hard read, but here is their takeaway: "The aggregate effects of partisan redistricting are moderate in magnitude—in the modern period, this effect has typically been less than 10 House seats, with the last election where control of the House would have flipped in expectation occurring in 1954."

Michael Barone, "A House Popular Vote Majority Produced Few Seats but Is a Good Sign for Republicans in 2024," rasmussenreports, November 18, 2022. In effect, we see in 2022 a surprising reversal of the Chen/Rodden effect. Demographic clustering seems to have penalized the Republicans in 2022, not the Democrats.

SEPTEMBER 20 – GRIDLOCK, THE FILIBUSTER, MAJORITY RULE. How and why has the Senate filibuster evolved into a sure blocker at the 60-vote-pivot mark? How should we think about that? How should we think about “gridlock”? Is it a great idea to legislate by means of the “budget reconciliation” process? And so on.

Required:

Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, “The Filibuster,” Stanford Law Review 49:2 (January 1997), at pages 181-209, 214-224. A good deep history plus the Senate’s evolution into its tough 60-vote pivot of current times. The authors wrote this piece in the wake of Clinton’s 103rd Congress of 1993-94. In that Congress, the Democrats struck out on a priority economic stimulus bill, campaign finance reform, and lobbying reform, as well as a non-watered-down motor voter bill, even though they enjoyed White House leadership, a favorable House vote, and an apparent Senate floor majority for these items. They didn’t have the needed 60 Senate votes. Other instances of this losing statistical plight during that era include the Bush 41 Republicans on a capital gains tax cut in the 101st Congress, Clinton again on campaign finance reform in the 105th Congress, and the Bush 43 Republicans on repeal of the estate tax, Alaska oil drilling, and a curb on medical malpractice suits in the 109th Congress. The 60-vote pivot was acting as an equal-opportunity killer.

Gregory Wawro & Eric Schickler, “Reid’s Rules: Filibusters, the Nuclear Option, and Path Dependence in the US Senate,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 43:4 (November 2018), 619. A one-page update of Fisk & Chemerinsky to take into account the relaxations of the pivot in 2013 and 2017 to ease judicial and executive appointments.

Josh Chafetz, “The Phenomenology of Gridlock,” Notre Dame Law Review 88 (2013), 2076-2087. A theoretical essay. “Rather than asking why we experience gridlock, we should be asking why and how legislative action works. We should expect to see legislative action...when there is sufficient public consensus for a specific course of action.” Along the way, this piece is nice on the ins and outs of budgetary politics under Obama—the shutdowns and the rest.

Suggested:

State legislatures. In either chamber of the U.S. Congress, control is always organized by one party. Things are sometimes more flexible in the state legislatures. Here is a file of ten instances, a page apiece, in which a cross-party coalition has organized a state assembly or senate. Could this happen at the national level?

GRAD: Gregory J. Wawro & Eric Schickler, “Reid’s Rules: Filibusters, the Nuclear Option, and Path Dependence in the US Senate,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 43:4 (November 2018), 619-647. A theoretical essay. Basically, the Senate keeps on with its supermajority

rules and customs because the senators like things that way, not because they are helplessly “locked in” by previous institutional choices.

The Federalist. Not exactly on point, but even so, Hamilton F62: “A senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from, and dividing power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the security of the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient.... The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies, to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions.” Madison F63: “What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have often escaped, if their government had contained so provident a safeguard [as the U.S. Senate] against the tyranny of their own passions? Popular liberty might then have escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens, the hemlock on one day, and statues on the next.”

SEPTEMBER 27 – LEGISLATIVE PRODUCTIVITY. A chronic concern is: What is Congress doing? How much is it doing? Is it getting off the dime? We heard a lot of that in 2021-2022. The topic seems to cry out for measurement. Journalists keep counting numbers of laws passed. The Divided We Govern extract here is first of all an early scholarly crack at the matter. It is also a picture of a kind of baseline law-passing normality during 1947-1991. Today we seem to have a new normal. Counting significant enactments isn’t so easy as it was. Upon us are monster omnibus enactments that pack everything inside and count as one law. New exercises in measurement are needed. Farhang’s piece here is such an exercise. General questions: Why should we care about congressional “production” or “productivity”? What is the argument? Anyway, how should we measure things? Or should we even try to measure things?

Required:

David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-2002 (Yale UP, 2005; an earlier edition with the same pagination is dated 1991), pages 34-76. An exercise in measurement and congressional action. What were things like back then?

Sean Farhang, “Legislative Capacity and Administrative Power Under Divided Polarization,” Daedalus 150:3 (Summer 2021), 51-67. Congress and regulatory legislation in recent times. How much of a control on the executive branch?

Eric M. Patashnik, “Backlash Politics in America’s Disunited and Polarized State,” Studies in American Political Development 36 (2022), 151-155. New laws can trigger public backlash.

Laws 2021-2022. A list of enactments in the style of Divided We Govern

Suggested:

Sarah Binder, "The Dysfunctional Congress," Annual Review of Political Science 18 (2015), at pages 91-94. Argues that to enumerate N's of significant enactments that depart from the policy status quo is not enough. Needed is a denominator. At issue is: What are the societal problems that need addressing? A ratio measure of N successes over N ex-ante aims is the way to go.

R. Douglas Arnold, "Explaining Legislative Achievements," chapter 12 in Jeffery A. Jenkins & Eric M. Patashnik (eds.), Congress and Policy Making in the 21st Century (Cambridge UP, 2016), at pages 301-10, 319-23. A discussion of measurement. Anyway, what's so great about being productive?

James M. Curry, Frances E. Lee & Robert L. Oldham, "Media (Mis)Perceptions of Congressional Action: Evidence from the Covid Pandemic," paper presented at the annual conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 8, 2022. The media, by dwelling on conflict rather than what is actually going on, tend to downplay congressional successes. A deft pioneering study.

David Mayhew, a five-minute rant against the media's coverage of Congress's action and production. CSPAN video, Congress and History Conference, July 23, 2017.

<https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1435688249155014657.html>

This is an exercise from Trump's first year as president, but the case is general.

Max M. Edling, Perfecting the Union: National and State Authority in the U.S. Constitution (2021), ch. 4

("Legislating: Implementing the Constitution"). A surprising new entry by a political scientist who specializes in the Federalist era. Measurement! Dataset! What kinds of topics did Congress address in its legislating during George Washington's presidency?

Winning coalitions chart. These days, looking at laws that reach the statute books, it is an oddity for a House majority party to experience their passage without supplying 218 of its own MCs (a floor majority) to vote for them. That is, the majority party gets them across the House finish line all by itself. Dialing Nancy Pelosi. This now obvious reliance is a surprisingly new thing. Looking back in time, necessary roll-call help from minority party ranks used to be common. Here is a selected list of such cross-party successes during 1947 through 2013. A lot of major history resides in these instances.

The Federalist. Hamilton F62: *"It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood: if they be repealed or revised before they are*

promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes, that no man who knows what the law is today, can guess what it will be tomorrow.” Madison F37: “Stability in government, is essential to national character.... An irregular and mutable legislation is not more an evil in itself, than it is odious to the people....”

OCTOBER 4 – IDEOLOGIES

Required:

Three ideology charts. The first two of these focus on House roll call voting across history. The canonical source on this matter is Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Ideology and Congress (2007). P&R organize all of congressional roll-call history by calculating which MCs agree or disagree with each other in instances of conflict. Issuing from this measurement, among other things, is a dominant dimension of conflict extending across time, to which the authors apply labels. The third chart here is a current gauge of public opinion.

Hyrum Lewis & Verlan Lewis, The Myth of Left and Right: How the Political Spectrum Misleads and Harms America (2023), chapters 1-3. Left and right, liberal and conservative. What are we to make of these labels? Here is a zestful, skeptical take on the matter. It is especially good in cautioning against exporting these labels backward through U.S. history.

Richard H. Pildes, “Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America,” California Law Review 99:2 (April 2011), at 287-297. Why polarization? Here is a theory. It is a story that involves demographic change accompanied by ideological invention, reconfiguration, and drift.

Suggested:

Katherine Cramer Walsh, “Putting Inequality in Its Place: Rural Consciousness and the Power of Perspective,” American Political Science Review 106:3 (August 2012), 517-532. Urban versus rural? What is the story? Do rural folks code politics in a distinctive way? Wisconsin. Based on long conversations with people around the state.

OCTOBER 11 - PARTISAN POLARIZATION.

Required:

Frances E. Lee, Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign (2016), chapters 1-6, 9. Argues that close party competition for control of the House since 1980 or so has greatly affected internal congressional operations. Fight! Take no prisoners!

The Federalist. Madison F10: *“So strong is this propensity of mankind, to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions, and excite their most violent conflicts.... When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government...enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens.”*

OCTOBER 25 – POLICY HISTORY 1. Here the readings swerve into a three-week span of deep congressional history. For comment papers during these weeks, what are we to make of this history? How does it bounce against my previous understanding of these past times? What is being said that is surprising or new? What is left out? Is there a takeaway for understanding the politics and policymaking of today? How have things evolved? How has the constitutional structure of 1787 played out through time?

Required:

David R. Mayhew, The Imprint of Congress (Yale UP, 2017), pages 1-42. Introduction, the 1790s through the post-1860s industrial surge.

Peter L. Rousseau & Richard Sylla, “Emerging Financial Markets and Early US Growth,” Explorations in Economic History 42 (2005), at pages 1-14. The country’s new financial system of the 1790s, due chiefly to Alexander Hamilton, as a spur to take-off economic growth.

John E. Ferling, Adams vs. Jefferson: The Tumultuous Election of 1800 (Oxford UP, 2004), chapter 12 (“...Horrors, The House Decides the Election”). Making a deal.

Isaac Ehrlich, Adam Cook & Yong Yin, “What Accounts for the US Ascendancy to Economic Superpower by the Early Twentieth Century? The Morrill Act-Human Capital Hypothesis,” Journal of Human Capital 12:2 (2018), undergrads read pages 233-40, 274-81, grads all of it. Were Congress’s subsidies for the land-grant colleges a significant lever?

Suggested:

Todd Estes, “Shaping the Politics of Public Opinion: Federalists and the Jay Treaty Debate,” Journal of the Early Republic 20:3 (Autumn 2000), 393-422. What did lawmaking look like in this major showdown of the 1790s?

Alfred A. Cave, “Abuse of Power: Andrew Jackson and the Indian Removal Act of 1830,” The Historian 65:6 (Winter 2003), at pages 1331-37. The roles of president and Congress in this imperial drive.

Charles S. Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era," American Historical Review 105:3 (June 2000), at pages 813-23. Argues that the 1860s were the true hinge point of the 19th-century in the U.S. and elsewhere. National consolidations. Jibes with the citations to Kolchin, Hobsbawm, Deudney, Bayly, Foner, Degler, Fredrickson, and Osterhammel supplied in the Imprint book.

Corey Brooks, "Stoking the 'Abolition Fire in the Capitol': Liberty Party Lobbying and Antislavery in Congress," Journal of the Early Republic 33:3 (Fall 2013), at 523-35.

The Federalist. Hamilton F6: *"Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than monarchies? Are not the former administered by men as well as the latter? Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisition, that affect nations, as well as kings? Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and other irregular and violent propensities?"*

NOVEMBER 1 - POLICY HISTORY 2

Required:

David R. Mayhew, The Imprint of Congress, page 42-65. The Progressive era, the Great Depression, the welfare state

W. Elliot Brownlee, "Wilson and Financing the Modern State: The Revenue Act of 1916," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 129:2 (June 1985), 173-210. How the country's lasting mix of corporate, estate, and personal income taxation emerged from defense preparedness for World War I, thanks to the presidency plus insistent congressional progressives.

Jeffrey W. Meiser, Power and Restraint: The Rise of the United States, 1898-1941 (Georgetown UP, 2015), pages xiii-xxx and 260-65. Why didn't the U.S. match Britain, France, and other countries in seizing large, long-lasting colonial empires during this era of competitive offshore expansion? This is a puzzle in some international relations theory. Well, both Congress and public opinion seem to have acted as major drags.

Randall E. Parker, The Economics of the Great Depression: A Twenty-First Century Look Back at the Economics of the New Deal Era (Edward Elgar, 2007), ("An Overview of the Great Depression"), pages 1, 12-15, 25-28. The gist of a report based on interviews with a dozen leading economists of recent vintage. In recovery terms, what were the roles of the presidency, Congress, fiscal policy, monetary policy?

Joshua K. Hausman, "Fiscal Policy and Economic Recovery: The Case of the 1936 Veterans' Bonus," American Economic Review 106:4 (2016), at pages 1100-03. Thanks to Congress, here was a blast of countercyclical fiscal policy, so to speak.

Monica Prasad, The Land of Too Much: American Abundance and the Paradox of Poverty (Harvard UP, 2012), at pages 148-59, 166-71. Over the long run, given European comparisons, U.S. progressive taxation hasn't yielded an awful lot of government revenue.

James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (Brookings, 1968), at pages 308-21. How did they enact Medicare/Medicaid in the 1960s?

Suggested:

Michael D. Bordo & Hugh Rockoff, "The Gold Standard as a 'Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval,'" Journal of Economic History 56:2 (June 1996), 389-428. Why the persisting support for the gold standard across several decades?

Gyung-Ho Jeong, Gary J. Miller & Andrew S. Sobel, "Political Compromise and Bureaucratic Structure: The Political Origins of the Federal Reserve System," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 25:2 (2008), 472-498. How the structural independence of the Fed emerged from congressional compromise.

Alonzo L. Hamby, For the Survival of Democracy: Franklin Roosevelt and the World Crisis of the 1930s (Free Press, 2004), at pages 120-29. FDR's classic "hundred days" legislative binge of 1933.

Christina D. Romer, "What Ended the Great Depression?" Journal of Economic History 52:4 (December 1992), at pages 757-61, 781-84. The prize seems to go to monetary policy.

G. John Ikenberry & Theda Skocpol, "Expanding Social Benefits: The Role of Social Security," Political Science Quarterly 102:3 (Autumn 1987), 389-416. On the enactment of the Social Security Act of 1935. Given European comparisons, why did government social provision come relatively late to the U.S. and take the form it did? The historical messiness of congressional processes seems to be one reason.

The Federalist. Hamilton is well-known for favoring an energetic presidency. But his view on this wasn't all that inconsistent with his general pessimism about the exercise of power. The crystal-ball expectation of 1787 had it that the new presidency wouldn't be hinged to an arousable public like the House and thus couldn't be all that menacing. The House would be the popular body. Hence Hamilton F70: *"A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution: and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad*

government. Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will agree in the necessity of an energetic executive, it will remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this energy?.... The ingredients which constitute energy in the executive, are, unity; duration; an adequate provision for its support; competent powers.” One gets the sense that Hamilton would have been quite at home with FDR at crisis times in 1933 and 1939-41.

NOVEMBER 8 – POLICY HISTORY 3

Required:

David R. Mayhew, The Imprint of Congress, pages 66-116. Since World War II, conclusion.

Charles A. Kromkowski, chart from “Electoral Participation and Democracy in Comparative-Historical and Cross-National Perspective,” APSA paper 2003, updated to include data for 2004 and 2008. This is a one-page chart prefaced by an explanation. Browse along with page 112 of Imprint.

Robert L. Fleegler, “Theodore G. Bilbo and the Decline of Public Racism, 1938-1947,” Journal of Mississippi History 68:1 (2006), 1-28. How did the Senate’s most vicious racist lose his license to rant? Note the major change in background political climate associated with World War II.

Martha Derthick, Agency Under Stress: The Social Security Administration in American Government (Brookings, 1990), chapter 4 (“Congress as Legislator”). This work by the leading historian of Social Security dwells on a particular policy wrinkle, but it offers a fetching general discussion of the complexities that can be associated with Congress’s monitoring and updating of programs.

Eileen Burgin, “Congress, Policy Sustainability, and the Affordable Care Act: Democratic Policy Makers Overlooked Implementation, Post-Enactment Politics, and Policy Feedback Effects,” Congress and the Presidency 45:3 (2018), 279-314. Discusses member and party incentives in play in the ACA enactment process of 2009-2010.

Suggested:

Eric M. Patashnik, Putting Trust in the US Budget: Federal Trust Funds and the Politics of Commitment (Cambridge UP, 2000), chapter 6. How did the government launch the interstate highway program in the 1950s? It took immense planning and compromising. For one thing, they needed a way to pay for it. A lesson for us all in the politics of infrastructure design.

Francis G. Castles, "The Dynamics of Policy Change: What Happened to the English-speaking Nations in the 1980s," European Journal of Political Research 18 (1990), 491-513. The onset of neoliberalizing reform to the economies of Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S.

David Vogel, "The Hare and the Tortoise Revisited: The New Politics of Consumer and Environmental Regulation in Europe," British Journal of Political Science 33:4 (2003), 557-580. Why did the U.S. pioneer in environmental regulation in the 1960s and 1970s yet come to lag in later years? See Congress's role.

Peter A. Hall, "The Electoral Politics of Growth Regimes," Perspective on Politics 18:1 (March 2020), 185-99. A new periodization of post-World War II policy regimes that resembles the design in Mayhew, The Imprint. Growth, neoliberalism, then what?

JUST FOR GRAD STUDENTS: Gabriel Felbermayr & Jasmin Groschi, "Within U.S. Trade and the Long Shadow of the American Secession," Economic Inquiry 52:1 (January 2014), 382-404.

NOVEMBER 15 – NARRATIVE HISTORY 1: THE ARMY-MCCARTHY HEARINGS, WATERGATE

Required:

David M. Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy (paperback ed. 2019), chapters 28 ("The Hearings Begin") through 32 ("Censure"). This is pages 416-494 in the 2019 edition. Senator McCarthy's span of influence ran from 1950 through 1954. The showdown in focus here is the final Army-McCarthy hearing of 1954, the senator's last and most renowned enterprise. It played on television before millions of viewers and it brought him down. Note that we see here a conflict between institutions. At the core of it all, the congressional committee chair, McCarthy, tangled with the president, Eisenhower.

Stanley L. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon (1992 paperback), chapters 18 ("Well, Al, There Goes the Presidency") and 19 ("Judgment Days"). This is pages 471-526 in the 1992 edition. We see here the final act of Watergate, the deliberation in the House Judiciary Committee that ended in a vote to recommend impeachment. That means a great deal is left out. There was a key, early, executive-centered investigative phase that by itself might have brought Nixon down. The Senate held explosive televised hearings in 1973. The courts and the media weighed in. Finally, the House Judiciary Committee struck in 1974. Note that President Nixon was never formally impeached or convicted, but that he surely would have been if he hadn't resigned. His support in the Senate had collapsed.

Suggested:

K.A. Cuordileone, "The Torment of Secrecy: Reckoning with American Communism and Anticommunism after Venona," Diplomatic History 35:4 (September 2011), 615-642. Soviet spies? Here is a lookback in the light of later cascading evidence. "Venona" refers to Soviet cables of the 1930s and 1940s that were hard to decode and weren't public knowledge until decades later.

Jennifer Delton, "Rethinking Post-World War II Anticommunism," Journal of the Historical Society 10:1 (March 2010), 1-41. Another reflective lookback.

Michael Schudson, "Watergate: A Study in Mythology," Columbia Journalism Review 31:1 (May 1992), 28-33. Did the press really bring down the president? Also, did Watergate really change the press?

Mark Feldstein, "Watergate Revisited," American Journalism Review 26:4 (August-September 2004), 60-68. More on the journalists.

Paul Matzko, "'Do Something about Life Line,' The Kennedy Administration's Campaign to Silence the Radical Right," Presidential Studies Quarterly 48:4 (December 2018), 817-31. Where were the conservative media during Watergate? A surprising story. No Fox channel or Rush Limbaugh back then.

The Federalist. Hamilton F65 on impeachments: *"The prosecution of them...will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide it into parties, more or less friendly, or inimical, to the accused. In many cases, it will connect itself with the pre-existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence, and interest on one side, or on the other; and in such cases there will always be the greatest danger, that the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of the parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt."*

NOVEMBER 29 - NARRATIVE HISTORY 2: FDR'S ATTEMPT TO REFORM THE SUPREME COURT.

In 1937, fed up with Supreme Court strikedowns of some of his major domestic policies and fearing more such strikedowns, President Roosevelt moved to reform the Court. "Court-packing," the drive came to be called. It was a legislative drive. A White House proposal would have expanded the Court from nine to fifteen justices (at least in some circumstances), a boon to the New Deal's policy aims given FDR's likely fresh appointees. An immense conflict ensued in the Senate. The drive went on for months and finally lost. At the end, no floor majority existed for it in a Senate composed of 75 Democrats, 17 Republicans, and 4 Independents. Note that it is quite OK under the Constitution for Congress to enact a statute changing the size of the Supreme Court. No problem there. It can constitutionally be

done. But the politics can be tough. In all of U.S. history, it is hard to find a conflict between White House and Congress more tense than this one in 1937. Alsop & Catledge, published in 1938, is a blow-by-blow hot-off-the-presses account of the court-packing controversy. These were talented journalists.

Required:

Joseph Alsop & Turner Catledge, The 168 Days (Doubleday, 1938). This classic work is long out of print, copies at Yale are scarce, and the used copies available online are expensive. Hence, the scanned version posted here on the CANVAS website in eight packets seems like the best bet.

Court-packing coalitions in 1937. A 2-page chart. This is a plausible size-up of how each senator would have voted in the summer of 1937 if a showdown vote on the plan had been held. None was held. It is interesting to see the partisan and regional patterns. Where were the southern Democrats?

Suggested:

Michael Nelson, "The President and the Court: Reinterpreting the Court-packing Episode of 1937," Political Science Quarterly 103:2 (Summer 1988), 267-293. An interpretation of FDR's behavior.

Gregory A. Caldeira, "Public Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court: FDR's Court-Packing Plan," Public Opinion Quarterly 81:4 (December 1987), 1139-53. The drift in public opinion polls during the many months of the confrontation. What motored the evolution of views?

The Federalist. Madison F47: *"The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."* Madison F51: *"The great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others.... Ambition must be made to counteract ambition."* Hamilton F78: *"The judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power;...it can never attack with success either or the other two; and...all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks....Periodical [as opposed to lifetime] appointments, however regulated, and by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to [the judges'] necessary independence."*

DECEMBER 6 – POPULISM, STRONGMEN, NORMS AND RULES, AND SEPARATION OF POWERS

Required:

Kurt Weyland, "How Populism Dies: Political Weaknesses of Personalistic Plebiscitarian Leadership," Political Science Quarterly 137:1 (2022), 9-42. The U.S. in comparative perspective. Populism can be a threat to democracy, but a system anchored in strong parties, separation of powers, and rule of law has good defenses.

Tianyi Wang, "Media, Pulpit, and Populist Persuasion: Evidence from Father Coughlin," American Economic Review 111:9 (2021), 3064-3090. Populist media stars are not a new thing. See this fascinating new piece about U.S. politics in the 1930s, even if it doesn't entail Congress (not directly anyway) or even a candidate for public office. Father Charles Coughlin was an anti-Semitic, pro-fascist, isolationist whose constant rants on the radio during that decade drew a listenership of some 30,000,000. That is an astonishing figure. In terms of U.S. listenership per capita, it beats Rush Limbaugh by four to one. As this article demonstrates, Coughlin was a force of political consequence. It is interesting to see how the public and private institutions of the time cabined him, albeit not easily or quickly.

Suggested:

Jason Brownlee & Kenny Miao, "Why Democracies Survive," Journal of Democracy 33:4 (October 2022), 133-149.
Similar to Weyland article.

Rogers Brubaker, "Why Populism?" Theory and Society 46 (2017), 357-385. Good exercise in definition and discussion.

Sergei Guriev & Elias Papaioannou, "The Political Economy of Populism," Journal of Economic Literature 60:3 (2022), 753-832. Definitive discussion of causes, features, effects.

The Federalist. A general menace-to-the-system red flag from Hamilton in F1: "*So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes which serve to give a false bias to the judgement, that we, upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions, of the first magnitude to society.... Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other motives, not more laudable than these, are apt to operate upon those who support, as upon those who oppose, the right side of a question.... Of those men who have overturned the liberty of republics, the greatest number have begun their career, by paying an obsequious court to the people...commencing demagogues and ending tyrants.*"

STATECRAFT, WEAVING THE FUTURE, POLICY PLANNING

Syllabus Of Ten-Day Workshop for Senior Decision-Makers, Policy Planners, and Strategy Advisors (10 hours per day and a number of evening exercises -- residential)

Yehezkel Dror

Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Hebrew University

Preparatory readings are selected to fit profiles and reading potential of participants. Each subject is presented in class, discussed in light of experience of participants, applied to given situations in individual and group exercises, and reconsidered after the exercise. Three integrative multi-stage evening exercises sum up clusters of subjects, with an 8 hours overall summing up exercise.

1. Statecraft` Between "Blowing Bubbles" and "Weaving the Future"

Governments always engage in some mixture between blowing bubbles, fighting fires, distributing goodies, and weaving the future. However, modern developments, such as mass media, result in blowing of bubbles increasingly displacing weaving the future. Dangers of "multi-media mass democracy". Hence the need for counter-measures strengthening weaving the future capacity, as in part developed in this workshop.

2. Groundings for Statecraft

The idea of "statecraft" and its adjustments of "humanitycraft". Main bases: Values and goals; will to influence the future for the better; understanding of historic processes and estimation of

opportunities and dangers; innovative intervention options; intervention resources including power. Need to upgrade moral and cognitive capacities. Towards "statecraft professionals"?

3. Improving Capacities to Govern: Preliminary Look

The real issue is one of "incapacities to govern" and not "ungovernability". Growing impact potent of governance without choice improvements produces a dangerous hiatus. A very small number of politicians and other governance staffs unavoidably make critical future-influencing decisions. Hence the need for a broad approach to improving governance, including "taboo" subjects such as upgrading moral and cognitive faculties of senior elected politicians. Exercises explore possibilities to do so.

4. Strategic Policies As Setting Trajectories in Time

Strategic policies as attempting to influencing the future and setting new trajectories into time, by "intervening with deep history". Exercises explore capacities to engage in strategic choice and main problems of doing so.

5. Outlook: A Glance Towards the Future

Main "deep drivers" of the future: demography, science and technology, values and ideologies. Climate changes? Main features of present and foreseeable global and local dynamics, such as Kafkaen processes. Need for thinking in terms of hyper-Heraclitean perspectives, together with awareness of many relative stabilities. "Globalization". Alternative geo-strategic and geo-cultural futures: Huntington vs. Fukuyama. "Regionalization". Decline of the West? Turbulence, uncertainty, incomprehensibility and inconceivability. Exercises explored some main challenges, threats and opportunities.

6. Diagnostics of Dynamics

Policies must be based on knowing and understanding of salient processes, instead of "estimates of situations". Problematic of intelligence estimates and their improvement. Interface between

estimations of dynamics and decisionmakers. Exercises discuss intelligence failures and designs for improved diagnostics.

7. Thinking-in-History

Thinking-in-history as an essential basis for policymaking. Problems of appropriate time horizons. Common misuses of history and their prevention. Exercises consider pressing policy issues within long-term history.

8. Decisionmaking Regimes

Selection of decisionmaking regimes fitting situational dynamics, with incrementalism on one extreme and break-out radicalism on the other. Exercises identify main issues in need of different decisionmaking regimes.

9. Debugging Choice

Identification of main choice pathologies, such as "motivated irrationality", and their reduction, as an essential approach to policymaking improvement. Other main approaches: approximating preferable models and meeting normative rules.

10. Advanced Policy Cogitation Frames

Main frames for policy planning and strategic choice, such as evolutionary potential mapping, design of realistic visions, competitiveness, and rise and decline of nations. Exercises apply some of the frames.

11. Critical Choice and Agenda Setting

Critical choices as cross roads in time and opportunities to significantly shape the future, as contrasted with hard problems lacking options. Agenda setting between the urgent and the

important. Improvement of problem images, attention allocation, and apportionment of decisionmaking resource. Uses of policy R&D to generate new options. Exercises identify main critical choices and hard issues, applying protocols for allocating decision resources accordingly.

12. Basic Deliberator and its Uses

Core elements of decisionmaking, their nature and improvement. The basic policy analysis schemata. Exercises explore possibilities and limits of quantitative decisionmaking and of decision support systems, applied to qualitative and partly obscure policy spaces.

13. Augmenting Heuristics

Heuristic as central to complex strategic choice. Relations to other "extra-rational" dimensions of strategic choice, such as creativity and value judgment. Ways to stimulate them, including metaphoric thinking. Need for multiple "languages" and multiple "cultures". Exercises explore the use of "metaphors" for exploring enigmatic policy issues.

14. Realistic Visions and Nightmares

Design of realistic visions and nightmares as providing policy compasses. Their political uses and misuses. Exercises work out realistic visions and nightmares and examine their action implications.

15. Alternative Futures: Between Necessity, Contingency, Chance, and Choice

The "policy cosmos" as between necessity, contingency, chance and choice. Main cartography for mapping the future, including uncertainties, incomprehensibilities, and inconceivabilities. Exercises map selected policy domains in terms of alternative open-ended futures and surprise potentials.

16. Policy-Gambling: Strategic Choice as Fuzzy Gambling with History

Fundamental view of decisionmaking as fuzzy gambling, with the essence of strategic choice being fuzzy gambling with history for high stakes. Radical implications for all of policymaking and politics. Exercises examine main protocols for improving policy-gambling and apply them to crucial choices.

17. Crisis Steering

Crisis steering as the ultimate mode of coping with uncertainty and inconceivability. Crisis instigation as a break-out strategy. Professional supports for crisis steering and their prerequisites. Night crisis exercises present major crisis situations in stages, demonstrating difficulties of crisis steering and potentials of improvement proposals -- summed up in a design exercise.

18. Policy Creativity

Policy creativity as essential for coping with novel situations. "Analysis" vs. "innovation". Creativity as a "black box". Main ways to increase options and encourage policy creativity. The roles of special policy R&D organizations (Think Tanks). Societal thinking as a critical resource.

19. Value Judgment Upgrading

Value judgments as decisive, but pose special problems. Distinction between "external" and "internal" views of values. Values as policy target vs. values as policy base. Value analysis as permitting improvement of value judgment without interfering with political prerogatives. Political costs of value deliberation improvement. Moral reasoning within policy thinking. "Moral luck" and "tragic choices". Contextual approach to moral choice. Virtues and vices in policymaking and the "fragility of the good". Exercises explore some value judgment issues and ways to cope with them better.

20. Systems View and Policy Coherence

Systems view of policy issues and of policymaking. System optimization vs. sub-optimization. Self-regulating systems vs. systems requiring detailed management and architecture. System

thinking methods and frames. Time dimensions. Exercises work out conceptual systems models of selected policy domains.

21. Complex System Transformation Reformcraft

Special issues of policymaking under conditions of radical change, when overall societal and political systems undergo transformation. Directed radical social change as supreme challenge: special issues and problems. Exercises consider reform policies and design decision systems fitting such conditions.

22. Policy Learning

The problematic of "changing one's mind" and "exiting oneself", as fundamental to essential policy learning. Barriers and ways to reduce them.

23. Cultural Settings

Policymaking and strategic choice as an existential expression of culture, seen within a comparative perspective. Possible cultural prerequisites for "high quality" policymaking and strategic choice. Exercises explore possibilities of achieving needed "cultural requirements" within policy planning enclaves.

24. Advising Rulers

The crucial and growing importance of "rulers" in critical choices, as well as setting policy styles as a whole, also in democracies. The importance of "advisors to rulers". Main roles of such advisors: informers, mentors, support providers. Dilemmas of advising rulers. Appropriate structures. Professional ethics for advisors to rulers. Exercises deal with problems of designing an "office" for a president of prime minister.

25. Institutionalization of Advanced Policy Planning and Statecraft-Professionalism

Main features of policy professionalism: building bridges between abstract knowledge and concrete issues; being "cold" on hot issues; doubting "common sense". Need for professional ethics. Relationship between professionalism and creativity. Implications for learning and career patterns. And for each policy-professionalism aspirant.

GLOBAL POLITICAL LEADERSHIP SEMINARY

(Chapter Thirteen from *TRANSFORMING OUR WORLD – NECESSARY, URGENT AND STILL POSSIBLE* edited by IVO ŠLAUS, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, November 8, 2020)

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13.1. Main Thesis

Main books on human evolution [To14]; a partial exception is [Tu16] do not mention rulers, however important at their time, and hardly refer to politics. They were right when dealing with human and cultural evolution up to the middle of the 20th. Century: Even rulers who caused large scale warfare did not change the long-term macro-history of humanity, nor did political processes as a whole (founders of religions and some of their followers, including single rulers shaping the fate of religions, did have such an impact, but this belongs to the history of civilizations not politics).

This changed with the first nuclear bombs, followed by synthetic biology, genome editing, climate change, and much more to come [Do18]. Such instruments can be used for advancing human thriving, or misused up to endangering the existence of the human species. Whether we like it or not, unavoidably politics is the process in charge of regulating the uses of such technologies, with a relatively small number of top level politicians, however constrained, being ultimately responsible for choices and policies fateful for the future of humankind.

This metamorphosis in the dynamics of humanity requires a novel type of global politics with a new genre of political leaders 2.0, as explored in other writings of mine. The present essay is more limited in scope, but pragmatically more practical. It presents a concrete proposal for setting up a cutting edge Global Political Leadership Seminary (GPLS), as a small but significant step in the needed direction.

A two-sided thought experiments will clarify this thesis: Let us imagine that the United Nations Organization (UNO), as presently constituted, is headed and directed by politicians totally committed to preventing global catastrophes and advance pluralistic global thriving, with emphasis on intergenerational fairness [Th13]; [Me16]. They reject “my country comes first” as tribalism sure to endanger the long-term survival of humankind.

Then imagine an optimally constructed global governance system, but headed and directed by the contemporary genre of political leaders. It is quite likely that in the first case humanity is

likely to thrive, while in the second the façade looks good, but in fact humanity is left exposed to escalating catastrophes. Therefore, upgrading salient qualities of the minds of political leaders is essential for steering evolution towards thriving and away from catastrophes (in addition to standard virtues required also from political leaders 1.0, in the meanings of Robert and Wood [Ro07], which I leave to main stream literature).

In any case, a strict global regime is essential for the survival of humankind. But, most likely, it will only come about after catastrophes teach unprepared humanity [Mi68] a needed lesson. However, even given an optimal global regime, and for sure till it is established, a novel genre of political leaders 2.0, both on global and national levels, is essential for long-term pluralistic thriving of humanity.

Conclusion: Given novel fateful challenges which require coping by political processes headed by political leaders; and given the obvious inadequacy of the vast majority of contemporary politics and political leaders, a novel genre of political leaders 2.0 and much improved political processes are essential. Therefore, efforts to radically improve salient qualities of political leaders should commence immediately.

13.2 Estimate of the Situation

A simple test can confirm this diagnosis and prescription: Let us take the members of parliaments and ministers of any country, including highly developed ones, and have them anonymously write essays on four subjects:

- What are main social implications of quasi-intelligent robots and what to do about them?
- How will laboratory-created life impact on human self-understanding?
- What would be the consequences of a molecular technology transmuted lead into gold?
- What to do about an emerging bio-engineering technology which is likely to prevent cancer but will enable preparation of mass-killing viruses in kitchen laboratories?

On the basis of my studies and experience, I am willing to bet 100 to 1 that very few politicians, including senior leaders, will write essays deserving at least a “pass” grade.

Reducing ignorance on science and technology and their social potentials is a relatively easy task if there is will to do so, which all too often is not the case. Thus, in a number of countries in which I advised heads of government and members of parliaments refused to promise participate in proposed five-day workshop on science and technology and their social implications.

However, the most dangerous forms of obsolescence of politicians are much deeper, as illustrated by tribalism, seeking of enemies combined with conspiracy theories, quite some atavism, lack of strategic thinking, unjustified self-assurance and also some corruption--all accompanied by preoccupation with the now and here and unrestrained priority given to staying in power.

To these must be added dealing with “bubbles” while ignoring fateful deep issues, running after opinion polls, intensifying plutocracy, growing pressures by egocentric or narrow pressure groups, passions overriding reason and more [Br17]. To make matters worse, such factors often paralyze the all too few political leaders qualified and willing to do what is needed.

Relevant is the fact that overall good books on public and political leadership which recognize some of the needs for improvements [Gi12], [Fo13], [Ha14], do not face the requirements of evolution steering.

Therefore the following demanding formula and postulate seems justified:

Formula: Obsolete politicians in charge of critical future-impacting choices + surging human powers to transmute the world and humanity itself = at least catastrophes; and not very unlikely self-destruction of humanity.

Postulate: All the more so, intense efforts to develop the required relatively small critical mass of morally, cognitively and qualified global and national political leaders 2.0 are essential for preventing global collapses.

13.3. The Truth

A short science fiction tale will serve to dramatize an unpleasant but unavoidable truth, namely that a tiny part of humanity largely shapes the life world of multitudes, and also increasingly impacts on future generations.

A sentient super-species occupying a number of planets in the Milky Way Galaxy senses the explosion of nuclear devices on Earth. It monitors global television and reaches the conclusion that the human species is on its way to self-extinction.

Recognizing that humanity is also capable of outstanding creativity and occasional impressive altruism the super-species decided to protect humanity from itself. After pondering ways to do so without revealing themselves, so as not to destabilize the as yet very immature human species, they decide to take over [surreptitiously](#) parts of the minds of one thousand acting and becoming political leaders, senior policy advisors, and spiritual leaders. The Weltanschauung and parts of the mindset of these select few were restructured so as to make them motivated and qualified to serve in various ways as superb Homo sapiens governors devoted to the long-term welfare of humankind and mentally equipped to do so.

A follow-up study one hundred years later showed that most of the selected humans reached high positions as global policy-makers and opinion shapers. They made human self-destruction very unlikely: the global political order was transformed; dangerous research and very disruptive technologies were abandoned while beneficial ones advanced rapidly; climate change was contained; nuclear weapons were neutralized; some easily misused human rights were curtailed while many beneficial ones were added; mass killings were stopped; and individual creative self-fulfillment was facilitated subject to some safeguards.

The super-species decided not to intervene, hoping for another evolutionary leap of humanity making it ripe to take part in trying to protect other promising species from self-destruction.

Returning to earth, a story does not prove anything. But its underlying assumption is correct: at any point in time a very small part of humanity exercises most of the increasing influence which humanity has on its future.

To make a guess on orders of magnitudes, a maximum of one hundred thousand humans exercise around eighty percent of impact on the future as far as shaped by human choice, with no more than about one thousand persons exercising sixty or so percent of that influence.

Even if this guesstimate is wrong by one or, as a maximum, two orders of magnitude, this does not change the truth, however unpalatable to many: a tiny part of humanity significantly impacts on the life world of all the nearly eight billion humans, within the context of local conditions but increasingly globally so.

13.4. Political Leaders Become Increasingly the Legitimate Ultimate Future-Shaping Decision Makers, However Bounded, Unwillingly, and Under-qualified.

For nearly all of human history, luckily so, main agents driving the future have been outside the rule of politicians. Spiritual leaders, thinkers, artists and poets, entrepreneurs, mass media moguls, the very rich, select aristocrats, a few local activists, celebrities and, increasingly so, scientists and technologies, have had most of the deep impact on the future, much more so than the bloodiest wars caused by politicians. But this is changing rapidly.

The challenges posed before humanity by leaping science and technology is increasingly fateful for the future of the species, with potentials for flourishing and calamities [Bo12], [Sm12], [Ba13], [Bo14], [Ha15], [Ha16], [Gh16] and [Re18]. This is clearly the case with nuclear weapons, climate change, robotics, human cloning, high energy physics and genome editing. To these must be added, within a longer time span, nano-technologies and radical human enhancement, perhaps synthesis of life in laboratories, cyber-sphere potentials, space uses and more.

As matters stands, increasingly important choices are made by a variety of actors, in particular scientists and economic entities seeking profits operating in relatively free global markets. Diverse social actors also exert some influence, as do some local and international political actors.

This would be more or less acceptable and in part preferable if the emergent effect of such a kaleidoscopic system would assure due attention to the future of humanity. But this is not and cannot be the case, because the motifs and qualities of such actors are inherently different from what can be called *raison d'humanité*.

Rather, in terms of both legitimating and potential effectiveness, politics is the only social institution and process formally entitled to act on behalf of states, citizen and, in principle, humankind as a whole. Furthermore, politics is the only agency that can potentially authorize and implement globally what can be called *humanity-craft*. (On line with the term *statecraft* applied to humankind as a whole).

13.5. Redesigning Governance

There are many ways to try and improve political systems in order to enable them to cope with novel fateful challenges. Quite some literature is devoted to it, in part focusing on problems of democracies (e.g., [Br16], [To18]); and in part, more interestingly, exploring possible lessons of Chinese experiences and theories [Gu02]; [Be16]. Going beyond it, to be considered, among others, are the following possible principles for reforming state governance:

- Concentration of decisive political power in a collegium of three persons, instead of one president or prime minister, with at least one woman and one non-politician, such as a scientist or literary creator, as members.
- Setting up a Second Chamber composed mainly of distinguished scholars, literary and art creators, thinkers and so on, with a quarter of members being selected by a lottery from all citizens.
- Establishing constitutional courts composed of senior judges and former senior politicians, selected by a panel composed by former political leaders, the heads of main academic institutions and non-partisan think tanks.
- Full disclosure by candidates for election of pertinent personal details, such as health, education, experience and capital, without regard to privacy rights.
- Subjection of top candidates to public interrogation on their knowledge and views, by panels selected by lottery, similar to selection of juries.
- Prolonged electoral cycles of six years, together with limitation to two consecutive terms of office of members of parliaments and governments.
- Erection of an effective wall between capital and political power.
- Radical reform of senior civil services to assure advanced professional qualification fitting emerging challenges.

Together with such and other state governance reforms, upgrading of global governance is very urgent. There is a huge literature on global governance, ranging from utopian ideas on a global democratic parliament (e.g., [Le18]) to proposals for a global climate Leviathan ([Wa18]), including some interesting theoretic treatments (e.g., [Zu18]). But, looking on the world as it is and its probable alternative futures for the next 100 years or so to perhaps be applied, it is difficult to hope for adequate handling of novel fateful challenges without a decisive global regime.

Ultimately, a global authority enforcing essential measures on a world-wide scale, if necessary against the will of states is indispensable. But such radical innovations are very unlikely to take place before catastrophes destabilize contemporary notions of state sovereignty.

Still, some lesser but beneficial steps may be feasible, such as:

- Reforms of the United Nations and especially the Security Council.
- Agreement by main powers, in particular China and the United States, together with the

- European Union, Russia and India, on what needs to be done and, if necessary, enforced.
- Advancement of regional polities on line with the European Union, without the right of secession.
 - A world-wide popular movement led by social leadership networks pushing select global measures, such as containment of climate change and nuclear disarmament.

But a novel type of political leadership based on committed global elite and supported by a growing part of humanity is probably the only agency which can bring about adequate global capacities to govern [Dr02]. However, as noted, the state of knowledge of the vast majority of political leaders is woefully inadequate for coping with the emerging fateful issues. It is not much better than the knowledge of medical doctors about a hundred years ago, when “there were so many people needing help, and so little that he could do for any of them. It was necessary for him to be available, and to make all these calls at their homes, but [...] not to have the idea that he could do anything much to change the course of their illnesses”[Th95]

On conventional issues political leaders with some background in law or economics and plenty of experience, supported by professionals, can sometimes be effective (Diamond 2019). And there are “mutant” rulers, to borrow a term from [Isaac Asimov's Foundation series](#), which excel as statecraft geniuses, beneficially or toxic as the case may be. But one cannot rely on them appearing and leading humanity through metamorphosis, as a kind of deus ex machina. Much more typical are the political leaders who rushed blindly into World War One ([Cl13]; [Le18]), as one striking example out of many clearly demonstrating the continuous “march of folly” [Tu14].

Humanity could survive mass-killings and wars, which indeed pushed cooperation and advanced science and technology and thus benefitted humanity as a whole [Fr15]; [Mo15]. But this is not true in respect to nuclear weapons and synthesized humanity-decimating viruses. What was bad but beneficial in the longer run is becoming species-endangering. Therefore, as noted, differently qualified political leaders become an existential necessity.

One can propose various ideas for moving towards political leaders 2.0 as urgently needed [Dr14]; [Dr17], in addition to already mentioned ideas, such as: public oversight of physical and mental health [Ow16], sabbaticals earmarked for study, attractive readings, encouragement of more qualified persons to try and become political leaders, improvement of the interface between senior politicians and qualified advisors, and periodic independent monitoring. But all such ideas are too far ahead of contemporary thinking and reality to become feasible in the foreseeable future, before catastrophes perhaps produce a steep learning curve.

Rather, desiring to make a feasible proposal, I focus in this chapter on one improvement module which is essential, useful and ready for urgent implementation, namely a cutting edge global political leadership seminary (GPLA). But, before presenting parts of a prototype design, a myth which was beneficial in the past [Ez12] but becomes increasingly dangerous if taken serious by those who count, needs treatment.

13.6. In the Name of the People

The overall mission of the GPLS is to encourage and enable acting and prospective political leaders to engage in pondering and acting in terms of the future of homo sapiens as a species composed of individuals who are self-aware, somewhat moral-deliberative and creative, but often dangerous to themselves, others and future generations.

However, this endeavor may be viewed as subversive of democracy (I leave aside contemporary China which has a different political leadership system, as discussed in [Li16]). The justification of democracy is rooted in the principle that those who bear the consequences are entitled to choose the decision makers, combined with trust in the good sense of populations. However, these arguments and images become inadequate when the political leaders chosen by contemporary voters impact strongly on future generations who do not elect them, as is increasingly the case.

This is not the place to develop a novel political philosophy fitting this new situation. But, definitely, being elected or otherwise selected now is not a sufficient basis for being entitled to impact strongly on the fate of future generations.

The more political leaders impact on future generations the less do democratic elections by themselves legitimize them. Being morally and cognitively qualified to do so is essential for having the right and accepting the responsibility to engage in fateful future-shaping.

Accordingly, as a cutting edge measure towards upgrading political leadership qualities the recommendation to set up a global political leadership seminary is fully justified. If well designed and run. It has a good chance of advancing participants towards the political leader 2.0 level. Furthermore, if successful it is likely to encourage and facilitate additional essential steps to improving political leadership, having at least a nudge.

([Th09]) effect and perhaps preparing the ground for a tipping point [Gl06].

13.7. GPLS Design

13.7.1 Willing to Become a Political Leader 2.0.

Moving on to the design of a prototype GLS, its first task is to advance a self-image of being responsible for the human species having a future and opportunities to thrive. But it should be clear that it is not up to political leaders, however qualified, to presume megalomaniacally to determine the substance of “human flourishing”, other than facilitating creativity and containing Hell of Earth. With individual and usually dangerous exceptions, they are not to serve as spiritual leaders. They are more a kind of “Servant Leaders” [Gt02]. But this is more than enough for the best of global political leaders 2.0.

Not a conversion effect should be expected. Still, by providing an intense and in part exhilarating experience it may help making carefully selected participant more of political leaders 2.0 in terms of self-image, commitment and ambition. Therefore emotional experiences

must be provided, mainly by exercises, projects and simulated experiences, while exhortations should be avoided.

For sure, all GPLS activities should encourage striving for excellence [Be03] by seeking knowledge, combining theory with praxis including improvisation, and independent thinking together with teamwork. But most important of all is a sense of commitment and mission. Spending, after a good dinner, a white night discussing what to carry away from Paulo Coelho's two books *The Alchemist* (1993) [Co93] and *Warrior of the Light: A Manuel.*(2006) [Co06] may be a good way to end a study period at the GPLA.

13.7.2 Preparatory Readings

Preparatory reading assignments need adjustment to participants and mentors. A senior political leader coming for a one week intense workshop cannot be expected to read in advance more than one or two not very long books. But a leadership aspirant coming for a longer study program should read in advance about five to seven books. The reading list does not teach techniques as the GPLS as a whole. Rather, it aims at the deeper levels of pondering as a basis for responsible choice. It should serve as an anchor for the learning process, being discussed when opportune.

The following seven books illustrate recommended preparatory readings:

- (1) Bertrand de Jouvenel: *The Art of Conjecture*, 2017 [Jo17]. This book serves to guide pondering in terms of alternative futures, as fundamental to all choice.
- (2) [Jared Diamond](#), *Upheaval: Turning Points for Nations in Crisis*. 2019 [Di19], with the help of historic cases, the author illustrates the problematic of proto-metamorphosis, concluding with a preview of emerging crises which introduced the domain of humanity-craft.
- (3) Jennifer A. Doudna and Samuel H. Sternberg: 2018 [Do18], *A Crack in Creation: Gene Editing and the Unthinkable Power to Control Evolution*, 2018; The most concrete fateful challenge, which is much less on the agenda than climate change and not as obvious as nuclear weapons, is genome editing. As well presented in this text it should be taken up in the learning process.
- (4) Yehezkel Dror, *For Rulers: Priming Political Leaders for Saving Humanity from Itself*, 2017[Dr17]. This short "Mirror for Rulers" is custom-designed for becoming global political leaders 2.0.
- (5) G.E.R. [Lloyd](#), *Being, Humanity, and Understanding*. Press, 2012 [L12], discusses philosophical issues cardinal for pondering on challenges faced by political leaders.
- (6) Ingram Persson and Julian Savulescu, *Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement*, 2014 [Pe14]. The two philosophers wrote this book probably as an act of despair. They do not think that prevalent human morality meets the requirements of survival of the species. Therefore they recommend technological enhancement of moral virtues – an act which radically reduces human freedom of choice and moral responsibility. This book should be discussed as posing tragic choices and requiring careful moral reasoning leading to responsible judgment.

(7) Martha C. Nussbaum: *Why Love Matters for Justice* 2013 [Nu13]. This book is fundamental for expanding the value compass guiding the steering of human evolution, with emphasis to be put during studies on necessary adjustments of ideal values to the realities of trying to save humanity from itself.

13.7.3. Being a Political Leader 2.0

Let me start with a core model of the being of a global political leader 2.0. It involves, first of all, total commitment to the fundamental value of assuring, as far as humanly possible, the long-term existence of the human species and its flourishing as understood by generation after generation. This is the primary mission, to be advanced by political leaders serving as helmspersons in charge of trying to steer human evolution.

In thus serving, global political leaders should thrive for perfection (as discusses in Cavell 1990), by developing appropriate qualities and engaging in constant self-evaluation, with the help of self-monitoring. Thus, a kind of meta-cognition [Pr13] is an essential process in the mind of a global political leader 2.0.

Thus, being a global political leader 2.0 is in many respects a way of live (in line with Hadot 1995, as adjusted to politics). However, there are few positions for global political leaders, mainly in the United Nations system. Furthermore, they are subordinated to national political leaders of main powers. Therefore, while the GPLS should explore with students a model of global political leaders 2.0, the actual task is to imbue participants with a desire and commitment to become in part global political leaders while serving in national leadership positions.

This can perhaps be justified in terms of the real long-term interests of the states in which they serve, but not always so. Therefore political leaders may face a moral and real-political dilemma on giving explicit or hidden partial priority to global needs also when doing so sacrifices some local needs and demands. This necessity and its moral price should be sensitively discussed with participants.

13.7.4. Thinking and Intuiting as a Political Leader 2.0

Given some measure of wishing to become more of a global political leader 2.0, mentoring should focus on core qualities of the mind specific to leaders. Thus, leadership executive functions are not a concern of the GPLS, but mental time traveling into the future [Ko16] is of cardinal importance.

Furthermore, in the terminology of Isaiah Berlin [Be78], global political leaders should be more like *hedgehogs*, who know one big thing, than foxes, who know many small things. This principle guides the following selection of mental requirements to be fostered by GPLS.

13.7.4.1. Model in the Mind

To cope adequately (*optimality* is conceptually and substantively probably beyond reach in the foreseeable future) with fateful challenges a political leader needs in her/his mind a more or less explicit at least partly dynamic model of the main processes shaping the future within a time horizon of 50 to 100 years, their drivers, alternative shapes and range of likely consequences, with attention to uncertainties [Ho13], known unknowns, surprise-prone areas and ignorance [Gr15]. Consequently, a high level of uncertainty sophistication is essential for global political leaders 2.0, enabling them cognitively and emotionally to make responsible choices while knowing that these are fuzzy gambles, often for fateful stakes.

This involves prospective thinking [Se16] and a predictive mind [Ho13] attuned to the limits of foresight [Ch08].

13.7.4.2. Moral Reasoning Abilities

Fuzzy gambling involves vexing choices between options with higher and lower likelihood of different outcome packages distributed between nearer and longer futures. But this is only one illustration of the fact that all choices depend on value preferences. This is glaringly the case when important values are involved, as they usually are in emerging global challenges. Thus various options may involve benefits for the future at the cost of suffering now; and deciding between the potential benefits of new technologies and their dangers.

Furthermore, widely accepted values, such as research freedom and privacy, require reconsideration when endangering public safety. And new possibilities, such as human cloning, are much contested. Therefore, “tragic choice” cannot be avoided.

There exist no algorithms for coping with value choices, which after all possible clarifications depends on human judgment. Still, the value choices can be clarified and made more transparent by diverse moral reasoning approaches (though these may increase disagreements by clarifying what is at stake). Trying to improve value choice processes is therefore a main task of the GPLS.

13.7.4.3. Abductive Inference

The *logic* of fuzzy gambling tragic choices for high stake is far above rational choice theory, Bayesian probability approaches - fast and slow simplistic decision psychology and so on. Instead, they involve overall Gestalt judgment supported by some heuristics but going beyond them. However, fundamentally they involve abduction, in the sense of the best possible guesstimate applied to choice.

This is a bitter pill for responsible decision makers when having to make fateful decisions. But they have to know what they are doing so as to make a maximal effort to deeply ponder

their critical choices and subject their choice processes as far as possible to monitoring by meta-cognition processes (Proust 2013) [Pr13] in their minds and by trusted advisors.

13.7.4.4. Teaming

Even the best of political leader 2.0 by himself is nothing; such political leaders without worthy partners and advisors are dangerous. Discourse with others is essential for coping adequately with complex issues. It is just as important for restraining the professional diseases of power holders, such as too much narcissism; exaggerated trust in oneself, and the various forms of Ruler's Craze as first discussed by the Roman historian Tacitus.

True, an outstanding ruler may be too restrained by partners. But, when fateful fuzzy gambles are faced this risk is small compared to those of inadequately restrained power. Therefore, the GPLS should emphasize the need of teaming and practice it (relevant is [Mc15]).

13.7.5. Essential Background Domains.

In principle the GPLS does not convey main stream knowledge available in books and university course. But there are at some critical domains which should be at least presented at the GPLS as they require an unconventional look fitting the perspective of a global political leader 2.0. These include, for instance, human malleability and the abyss between the cultures of science and technology on one side and of politics on the other.

The history of the Soviet Union (Daniels 2007 [Da07]; Brown 2009 [Br09]; striking is Slezkine 2017 [Sl17]) and, differently, the crisis of the Israeli Kibbutz movement (Abramitzky 2018 [Ab18]) teach much on the limits of human malleability. And the writings of Bruno Latour present important aspects of the culture of science. But the scarcity of focused treatments of both domains limits what I can recommend, with one overall point: knowledge and understandings essential for steering human evolution are sorely lacking. This also hinders the work of the GPLS, This leads in the direction of setting up a Global Evolution Steering Think Tank, perhaps in conjunction with the GPLS, as illustrated by the RAND Corporation Pardee Graduate Public Policy School in Santa Monica, California (disclosure: the author was closely involved in founding it. But this is a subject for another paper).

13.8. Learning Approaches

Crucial is the insight that politics is more like the exercise of a craft or art, than like traditional conceptions of what happens when a theory is applied. It requires the deployment of skills and forms of judgment that cannot easily be imparted by simple speech cannot be reliably codified or routinized, and do not come automatically with the mastery of certain theories..... One of the

signs that I have acquired a skill is that I can attain interesting and positively valued results in a variety and unexpected circumstances“ [Ge08]).

Therefore, active learning is the rule, with a mixture between preparatory readings, presentation of theories and lessons of experience in lectures and application exercises by individual students and teams.

But more innovative learning methods are needed for meeting the ambitious goals of the GPLS and penetrating the hard skulls of its audiences. Thus, well designed virtual reality games [Ba12]; [Ew18]), in which participates immerge themselves and deal with fateful challenges as avatars, can achieve motivational impacts, in addition to encouraging creativity and augmenting experience-based intuition. This is all the more important as subconscious processes, which fulfill essential roles in the pondering of decision makers, need and can be improved by vicarious experiences [Kl13].

13.9. Organization

13.9.1. Participants

The proposed GPLS should draw candidates with different life experiences who have proven potentials of becoming global political leaders and their advisors and want to explore such options. But the main audiences aimed at include, first of all, acting political and other public leaders, together with spiritual-cultural ones. Also important, but to be handled separately in cooperation with select universities, are aspiring political leaders and leadership candidates, such as advanced students. Additional desired audiences include global policy professionals, charismatic grass root leaders, outstanding entrepreneurs, cutting edge scientists and technologists, and mass media pundits.

Attractive facilities, also for families; fitting stipends when necessary; measured publicity; some famous faculty members and guest lecturers; and a “snob appeal” acceptance procedure may help getting desired participants. Civilization and life experience pluralism of the student body is a must, making excellent simultaneous translation necessary. But candidates for admission should be vetted to assure moral stature, cognitive abilities and sincere concern about the future of humanity.

13.9.2. Program Formats

Programs should vary to fit different kinds of participants, such as relatively short workshops for senior political leaders and three month courses for advanced students wishing to become global political leaders 2.0. Most of the programs will be residential. But, with time, online courses should also be offered, together with combinations between intense residential workshops and distance active learning method.

13.9.3. Faculty

It will not be difficult to find outstanding permanent and visiting faculty members on some of the subjects, such as climate change. But finding highly qualified staff on innovative core subjects, such as policy reasoning in terms of human evolution, and moral judgments on the uses of scarce life prolongation enhancement resources, is difficult.

However, as mentioned, the main problem is posed by scarcity of relevant knowledge. This leads to the necessity to associate the GPLS with knowledge-producing institutions, such as humanity-craft think tanks which too should urgently be established, but I leave this subject for another discourse.

Essential are faculty members who can synthesize theoretic models and abstract thinking with the practice of political leadership. Such persons are extremely scarce, making team teaching into a second-best approach, subject to careful running-in.

13.9.4. Resources and Financing.

The costs of setting up and running a cutting-edge Global Political Leadership Seminary are minimal compared to the resources required for substantive humanity-craft policies. A consortium of a few philanthropic foundations should be able to finance a GPLS. My guesstimate is that an initial budget of about five million Euros at current prices Euro might enable thorough evaluation of the proposals, preparation of action plans and some pilot testing.

Depending on scale and speed of development, as well as availability of suitable staff and facilities, an annual budget of about twenty million Euro should suffice for running the GPLS, which should not get too large, encouraging instead twin projects.

However at least two years of preparation are required before the Seminary can commence its activities.

13.9.5. Location

Let me conclude with a tentative comment on location of the main facility. It should be a well located small country between West and East with a high quality governance system and developed facilities. Singapore illustrates fitting options, all the more so as shared activities with the

Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy: Building a Global Policy School in Asia [Ma13] may ease the way.

13.10. Aspiration Level

Evoking interest in global perspectives and improving global leadership qualities are

achievable goals. Realistic expectations also include important side benefit, such as building up a network of cooperating graduates. Also, it is likely that the GPLS, if performing well and perceived as such, will stimulate inclusion of similar subjects in an increasing number of university programs and leadership development endeavor, though dilution of quality is an ever-present danger.

With the help of prudent public relations an impressive GPLS can also make a contribution to global awareness of fateful choices and mobilization of support for necessary measures. But, while a GPLS can be very cost-effective and may have catalytic effects, it should be clear that this is just one step on the extremely arduous path to high-quality steering human futures.

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