Case studies in Scientific Statecraft: Chaim Weizmann and the Balfour Declaration - Science, Scientists and Public Diplomacy
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I trust and feel sure in my heart that science will bring to this land both peace and a renewal of its youth, creating here the springs of a new spiritual and material life. [...] I speak of both science for its own sake and science as a means to an end.” (Chaim Weizmann, 1946)¹

In 1921 Albert Einstein joined Chaim Weizmann in a fund-raising mission to the US on behalf of the Jewish National Fund and the Hebrew University. (photo Einstein Archives Dept. of Media Relations, Hebrew University)

“The Balfour Declaration represented the convinced policy of all parties in our country and also in America, but the launching of it in 1917 was due, as I have said, to propagandist reasons.” -David Lloyd George²

“If a Jewish State were established in Palestine, it might become the centre of a new culture. The Jewish brain is rather a remarkable thing, and, under national auspices, the State might become a fountain of enlightenment and a source of a great literature and art and development of science.” Lord Herbert Samuel commenting on the Balfour Declaration.

Preface

This article is the second of a series investigating the importance of science and scientists in forging and fulfilling governmental objectives, a field I call “Scientific Statecraft”. The use of raw science in planning and policy is, of course, one element of the field. (A case-study is discussed in “Joshua’s Battle of Jericho: Scientific Statecraft in Warfare - Lessons in Military Innovation and Scientific Tactical Initiative.”³) However, beyond the raw knowledge and data that science furnishes the politician, broadening her or his options in forming policy or responding to constituent needs, the field addresses the role of the scientist qua scientist
within the realm of policymakers, governmental representatives and political enablers. It is proposed that the unique mind-set of a scientist⁴, someone trained in objectivity,⁵ who manifests integrity⁶ yet is no stranger to advocacy,⁷ coupled with membership in a community (scientists)⁸ regarded with esteem and respect world-over, gives the scientist-politician an advantage in forming and forging global policy. The unique world-view of true scientist affords them an ability to view old information in new ways which often eludes those trained in the more traditional métiers that form the personnel of State and Foreign Ministry Departments.⁹ Thus, it is proposed that science education and contacts in the scientific community translate into foreign policy successes¹⁰ which may not obtainable by traditional politicians trained in law, history or government.¹¹

Dr. Norman A Bailey commonly breaks the elements of (international) statecraft into six categories: Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy (Propaganda), Subversion, Economic Statecraft, Military Display and War.¹² Until the role of science is recognized as deserving a 'ministry' of its own, I will use each of these categories to illustrate the importance of either science or scientist in securing international policy objectives.

In the first article in this series,¹³ I discuss the prominence of Benjamin Franklin -- in his scientific capacity -- as leading to his successes in the realm of diplomacy.¹⁴ Therein I investigate Franklin’s role as America’s first successful envoy to France, demonstrating the importance of his scientific stature and contacts with other scientists as factors which rapidly helped secure critical agreements with France along with funding for the Revolutionary War. Continuing in that vein, here I examine the role of a scientist in creating the public diplomacy (propaganda) element which helped secure foreign policy objectives.

The public diplomacy case study is illustrated through the activities of Chaim Weizmann, later to become the first President of The State of Israel. Dr. Weizmann was, like Franklin, a scientist. In approach and achievements, however, he more closely resembled another American Scientist-Founding Father, Thomas Jefferson.¹⁵ While perhaps not as exalted as Franklin, Jefferson, the second US envoy to France, boasted laudatory scientific accomplishments. These accomplishments served to remind the French of the intellectual prowess of the nascent country -- a factor which helped convince them that -- contrary to the prevailing wisdom of Count Buffon -- Americans were not savages, and their quest warranted French aid. Could a non-scientist have performed that role? It is difficult to say, other than noting that two American lawyers, Silas Deane and John Adams, were on the scene before and contemporaneous with Franklin, and were both ineffective. It is also clear that on Franklin's ‘retirement,’ the French were desirous of someone who could fill his shoes.¹⁶ Similarly, Chaim Weizmann’s contributions were supplemented by another scientist, Aaron Aaronsohn, who became known to key British policy -makers and players in the British war office a full year before Weizmann’s efforts bore fruit.¹⁷

**Introduction: The Balfour Declaration as Propaganda**

The year was 1916. Britain was at war. The United States, as President Woodrow Wilson proudly boasted, was not. The Ottomans controlled the Holy Land -- and Britain was fighting on two fronts: against the Germans and against the Turks. The state of affairs for Britain was dicey. The British desperately needed help -- especially funding. They also
sought American support as an active ally. Very much like in recent times, it was American forces and Israeli Intelligence that came to British aid. But unlike today, the channels through which these forces were mobilized were novel and untried.

This is the back-story of the Balfour Declaration, a vehicle for British success in World War I and the cornerstone of the birth of the State of Israel. It is a story of the triumphs of Scientific Statecraft – of the influence of two scientists, Chaim Weizmann and Aaron Aaronsohn (whose role will be investigated in a companion article) in bringing about the Declaration. And it is a vindication of propaganda as a vehicle to effectuate international policy. These propaganda (public diplomacy) efforts resulted in the signing of the Declaration in 1917 which proclaimed British support for a Jewish Homeland and helped prepare the world for the creation of a Jewish state, the State of Israel, 31 years later.

The Importance of the Balfour Declaration to Statecraft: An Act of Propaganda

As the historian Jonathan Schneer writes in establishing the basis for labeling the Declaration a propaganda tool, 18 “the view from Whitehall early in 1916: “If defeat was not imminent, neither was victory; and the outcome [of the war]... could not be predicted...Britain’s willingness, beginning early in 1916, to explore seriously some kind of arrangement with ‘world Jewry’ or ‘Great Jewry’ must be understood in this context.” 19 It is against this background that The Balfour Declaration, which articulated British support for a Jewish Homeland and defined British policy towards Zionism at the time must be examined. Coupled with admissions from Prime Minister Lloyd George and prominent others as will be seen below, the function of the Declaration as a propaganda tool becomes clear and undeniable.

The ostensible objective of the Declaration, creating a Jewish homeland, was not limited to the British. The surge in pogroms, the fragility of Tsarist Russia, the Armenian Genocide of 1915 (which some viewed as a precedent that would be applied to Jews),20 and the subsequent expulsion of the Jewish population from Tel Aviv by the Ottoman rulers all preyed on collective Jewish consciousness. These forces also imprinted themselves on the psyches of sympathetic British Christians and Armenians:21 a Jewish Homeland was not an option. It was a necessity.

The notion of a National Homeland had been sparked decades earlier; the first ‘Aliyah' began in 1882 and the forces fomenting the Zionist imagination began even decades before that22,23 but the Zionist spark had not yet caught fire.24 Yet with each pogrom, with each massacre, and with each barrier to immigration imposed in the United States, the Jewish condition became more dire and the need for a Jewish Homeland more acute. But for the British, at least at the time, the motivation for the Declaration was purely for its propaganda value.

According to Lloyd George,25 the “policy [of a Jewish homeland] was .... decided by the Cabinet on merits, and I have no doubt ... that some such provision would by common consent ... have been inserted in the Peace Treaty even had there been no previous pledge or promise. But the actual time of the declaration was determined by considerations of
**war policy.** It was part of our propagandist strategy for mobilizing every opinion and force throughout the world which would weaken the enemy and improve the Allied chances. Propaganda on both sides probably played a greater part in the last war than in any other. "There were two paramount problems at that time... [One] was that the war preparations in the United States should be speeded up ... and we had every reason [to believe]... that ... the friendliness or hostility of the Jewish race might make a considerable difference." As William Ormsby-Gore, British Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies later noted: "After the declaration, the utmost use was made of it by Lord Northcliffe's propaganda department."

At a War Cabinet meeting held on 31 October 1917, Balfour suggested that a declaration favorable to Zionist aspirations would allow Great Britain "to carry on extremely useful propaganda both in Russia and America," as the cabinet believed that expressing support would appeal to Jews in Germany and America and help the war effort. It was also hoped to encourage support from the large Jewish population in Russia. The after-effects were not lost on the British either. Once a Jewish Homeland existed in Palestine – under British auspices and under British political control, the British could effectively "freeze out France (and anyone else) from any post-war presence in Palestine."

The propaganda value of the Declaration did not go unnoticed by the Germans. (Some say they considered doing something similar themselves). General Ludendorff is said to have said after the War that: "The Balfour Declaration was the cleverest thing done by the Allies in the way of propaganda, and he wished Germany had thought of it first"

Against this landscape the Balfour Declaration was born - but not without labor pains. The British wanted Wilson's support for the Declaration and they wanted it made public. Initially, Wilson balked at the 'going public' part, not wanting to antagonize the Ottomans. Then there were outright opponents and obstacles within the British Parliament. Next came the British Anti-semites, the Arabs and of course the Turks. And finally, just as now, there was a Jewish faction who opposed it, in Britain in the U.S. and in Palestine.

**A Brief Pre-History**

The concept of Zionism was circulated in the British Cabinet as early as November of 1914 by Lord Herbert Samuel in a memorandum entitled *The Future of Zionism.* Therein Lord Samuel reassured his colleagues that the vexing 'Palestinian Problem' could be solved by annexing the country to the British Empire. That proposal was rejected. It took three more years after that for the idea to germinate and bear fruit.

The idea for British support of a Jewish State arose even earlier than Samuel's proposal. The notion was conceived at the turn of the Century by several European Zionist leaders before making its way to the United States. The seeds of Zionism were planted in the British psyche as early as 1903. Sometime in 1904 or 1905, when Balfour was Prime Minister (and certainly well before 1914 when Balfour became Foreign Minister), Chaim Weizmann, then a lecturer in Chemistry at Manchester University, proposed the notion of a
Jewish home in Palestine to Balfour – whose positive views on the subject had already been articulated. Yet, it took more than a decade before the Declaration that bears his name finally was signed. First, the British had to coalesce and then mobilize behind the idea. That seems to have occurred by 1916. However, still another year went by before its formal issuance. While draft language of the document – and certainly the concept - had been circulating in parliament throughout 1917, not until the summer of that year was the idea formally and publicly proposed. In July of 1917, a full seven months after Lloyd George assumed the prime ministership, 44 Balfour, then Foreign Secretary, with Lloyd George’s approval and support requested Lord Nathan Rothschild, the leader of the British Jewish Community (to whom the eventual declaration was addressed), to formulate the exact wording of its contents.

Balfour received a draft from Rothschild in August. Three more months passed. An impasse in the form of Wilson’s reluctance to support the plan threatened to derail its adoption. During September and October furious negotiations on both sides of the Atlantic appear to have assuaged Wilson’s reservations. Any remaining objections were overcome via language revisions incorporated in the document. The British War Cabinet met in October and approved the new language and Balfour signed the document on November 2 and the Declaration bearing his name was made public on November 17. Eventually its principles were incorporated into the Paris (Sevres) Peace Treaty with Turkey in 1919 and confirmed by the League of Nations on July 24, 1922. 45 Ultimately “[T]he declaration was accepted by the League of Nations in 1922. With that enactment, Jews in the Holy Land were able to run their own internal affairs and economy, and Jewish cultural life flourished.” 46, 47.

Questions of Credit

The importance of the proclamation as a propaganda tool clearly can be seen by the increased support of American Jews, many of whom were of German extraction and had great difficulty severing their emotional ties with the ‘Fatherland’. 48, 49 It is its timing, as Prime Minister Lloyd George noted, that bears investigation: Why was the proclamation issued just when it was? Why not years earlier when both Lloyd George and Balfour first articulated support for Zionism?

That the issuance of the Declaration occurred more than a decade after the idea was first raised in Great Britain and almost three years after it had been placed in the consciousness of Britain’s political elite 50 suggests the influence of a person, (or persons) rather than the state of affairs must have been the driving – or at least a major contributing -- force. The prime candidates generally considered for this honor are Lloyd George, James Malcolm (the Armenian Representative in Britain), Sir Mark Sykes of the British War Office (and co-author of the later disavowed Sykes-Picot Agreement), and Chaim Weizmann. 51 History has downplayed and undervalued the crucial roles of Herbert Samuel and Aaron Aaronsohn, whose contribution will be discussed in the companion article. 52 The remainder of this article details the role of Chaim Weizmann in the production of the Balfour Declaration. 53
In one sense, it should come as no surprise that Weizmann would play a pivotal role in the Declaration’s development. His active role in Zionism can be documented as early as 1901 as a twenty-five year old member of the Fifth Zionist Congress. Yet in his professed interest in Zionism, he was hardly alone. Herzl, Trumpeldor, and Jabotinsky commanded the greatest prestige. American Zionists including Rabbi Stephen Wise and Jacob de Haas also were well-recognized. And there were other significant players.

Yet, unique among these Zionists, it is Weizmann who is credited with enactment of the Declaration. It is suggested that Weizmann’s repute in the world of science gave him a presence impossible for the British to ignore and his influence in promoting the idea for a Jewish Homeland was thus incomparable. That Weizmann should be listened to in no small measure derived from this scientific stature. Much like Thomas Jefferson, then, whose well-respected scientific pursuits and erudition elevated his stature at the French court and hence success at championing the nascent United States, Chaim Weizmann was a chemist who advocated before the British Court on behalf of an Independent Jewish State in Palestine.

If Weizmann does deserve the credit, one must ask what (suddenly) gave Weizmann the special entrée, prestige or respect to effectuate its proclamation in 1917, when his first proposal to Lord Balfour, thirteen years earlier, failed? What changed in the intervening years regarding Weizmann’s position or stature that enabled him to advance this proclamation to fruition? Certainly, the changing times alone cannot account the success. From a historic point of view the pivotal episodes generally considered to have mobilized the British Zionist movement occurred in 1914 – the year that the war broke out (in July) and the realization that the political winds had shifted, as revealed in a speech of Prime Minister Asquith in November of 1914 and a subsequent article that month on the same topic. Nevertheless a full three years elapsed before the Declaration was issued.

It should be noted at the outset that Weizmann’s scientific credentials (he published some 100 scientific papers and was awarded, alone or jointly, some 110 patents), along with his scientific contribution to the British War effort distinguished him from other ardent Zionists. However, it was a particular discovery that rendered the British indebted to him. In fact, this seminal scientific contribution (the discovery of the manufacture of acetone by fermentation) was so important scientifically, that Weizmann is considered the father of industrial fermentation. Weizmann’s process was discovered in 1914 and implemented during 1915 and 1916. By 1917 the practical implications to the British could not be ignored: Acetone is a necessary component of explosive munitions. The Germans were far more advanced and organized in establishing a ready supply and the British were in danger of forfeiting the war because of their munitions shortage. Weizmann’s discovery, then, was not only scientifically important, but crucial to Britain’s success in the war.

Lloyd George, Munitions Minister from 1915 to 1916, pointedly articulated that the Declaration was in no small measure a payback for Weizmann’s efforts. Lloyd George’s pronouncement should not be taken in a vacuum as it contradicts other statements both he
and Weizmann made. (It is however corroborated by Vera Weizmann’s account). Nevertheless, it helps explain why the idea for the Declaration was not ‘formally’ inaugurated until late 1916\textsuperscript{69} some months after Weizmann’s scientific triumphs became known to the British Cabinet and six months after the Munitions Ministry decided to forge ahead with large scale production of acetone using Weizmann’s process.\textsuperscript{60}

The Back-Story of the Balfour Declaration: Chaim Weizmann’s Scientific Contributions

Weizmann’s first patent was granted in 1901\textsuperscript{61}, the same year he became a lecturer in Chemistry at the University of Geneva, the same year he was a delegate to the World Zionist Conference, and the same year that saw him develop the self-confidence to openly disagree with Herzl. In 1904 he was offered a lectureship in chemistry at the University of Manchester, later becoming a leader among British Zionists. At that time, Prime Minister Arthur Balfour was also the Conservative MP representing Weizmann’s district and the two met during one of Balfour’s electoral campaigns. Balfour supported the concept of a Jewish homeland but felt there would be more support among politicians for situating it in in Uganda, an idea called ‘The British Uganda Programme.’ That proposal was dropped – in no small measure due to Weizmann’s opposition.

Between 1912\textsuperscript{62} and 1914\textsuperscript{63} Weizmann worked on developing synthetic rubber,\textsuperscript{64} as a consequence of which he discovered how to use bacterial fermentation to produce acetone.\textsuperscript{65} Acetone is a necessary component in the production of cordite,\textsuperscript{66} the vital propellant\textsuperscript{67} for bullets, shells and explosives. Prior to WWI, the acetone in British munitions was made from dry distillation (pyrolysis) of wood, a process requiring almost a hundred tons of birch, beech or maple to produce one ton of acetone,\textsuperscript{68} necessitating large imports of wood and hampering the ready supply of munitions. By 1915, Germany had cornered supplies of calcium acetate, a major source of acetone, further shifting the balance of power. Weizmann’s discovery provided the mechanism for mass production of acetone\textsuperscript{69} and hence reinvigoration, in fact, revival, of the British munitions supply, changing the outcome of the war. Lloyd George and Foreign Minister Balfour were, of course, properly grateful. Lloyd George writes:“The fact that Britain at last opened her eyes to the opportunity afforded to the Allies to rally this powerful people to their side was attributable to the initiative, the assiduity and the fervour of one of the greatest Hebrews of all time: Dr. Chaim Weizmann.” [Emphasis supplied].\textsuperscript{70}

It must be pointedly noted that not only did the success of the war efforts turn on Weizmann’s discovery, but so did the success of Lloyd George’s political future. The trajectory of Balfour’s career also benefited – at least indirectly. And while the importance of mass production of acetone to the war effort cannot be underestimated, it also contributed to the rapid rise to power of Lloyd George,\textsuperscript{71} which is inexorably intertwined with Weizmann’s discovery.

It is generally accepted that Lloyd George’s ascent to the Prime Ministership was directly occasioned by the Shell Crisis of 1915\textsuperscript{72} when munitions supply was at an all-time low. This situation resulted in the fall of the Asquith government in May of 1915,\textsuperscript{73} the formation of a
coalition government, the appointment of Lloyd George as Munitions Minister, and a year
and a half later his Prime Ministership. In that capacity Lloyd George appointed Arthur
Balfour to head the Foreign Ministry. There is ample evidence that the collapse of Asquith’s
government was in no small measure instigated by Lloyd George,74 aided and abetted by
Lord Northcliffe75 via scandalization of the Shell Crisis.

The Shell Crisis of 1915

By early 1915 there was increasing disquiet76 about the way the war was being
conducted77 and by March the shortage of British munitions became egregiously acute. On
March 10 at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle78 “the British fired more shells in a single 35-
minute bombardment than they had during the whole Boer War,”79 and that seems to have
exhausted their entire munitions supply. It appeared the British had enough guns but were
fast running out of anything to fire, and those shells that were available often failed to
explode or burst prematurely. On 12 March, German forces launched a counter-attack
which forced the British to use up most of the remaining artillery ammunition. 80 The
planned British response never materialized. Lord Northcliffe, the owner of The Times and
the Daily Mail, publicly blamed Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, for the debacle.81

Shortages of shells had been a serious problem since autumn 1914 and on March 27 of that
year, the British Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Sir John French,82 gave an interview to
The Times calling for more ammunition. Later on he stated “that the army forgot one of the
major lessons of the Boer War, namely that fire power won battles.” 83 Sir John sought to
make the issue of inadequate munitions public in an almost desperate attempt to persuade
Lord Kitchener,84 to get shells to the troops in adequate quantities.85 On the basis of
assurances from Kitchener that the army had sufficient ammunition, on April 20 Asquith
reassured the British of their military superiority. But by May 1915, the situation become
so serious that most British guns were reduced to firing just four shells a day. It seemed “as
if the war was going to be lost, not in the trenches of Flanders but the factories of Britain.”
86

After the failure of the Battle of Aubers 87 on May 9, 1915, The Times war correspondent,
Colonel Charles à Court Repington, sent a telegram to his newspaper again blaming lack of
high explosive shells. A copy of these documents was sent to Lloyd George and Balfour.88
On March 14, 89 the Times zealously reported that “we had not sufficient high explosives” 90
and commented that the “want of unlimited supply of high explosives was a fatal bar to our
success,” clearly putting the onus on the government.91 On May 14 the headline blasted A
NEED FOR SHELLS BRITISH ATTACKS CHEKCED LIMITED SUPPLY THE CAUSE.92 An even
more sensationalized version of the story appeared in the popular "Daily Mail" on May 21
specifically blaming Lord Kitchener. The headline blared, "The Shells Scandal: Lord
Kitchener’s Tragic Blunder.” Four days later, the Liberal government fell. In the aftermath,
Lord Northcliffe called for creating a Ministry of Munitions and the appointment of David
Lloyd George, previously known for his domestic interests, to head it. Munitions Minister
Lloyd George was a huge success, a success in no small measure due to the contributions of
Chaim Weizmann.93
Chaim Weizmann\textsuperscript{94} and David Lloyd George\textsuperscript{95}

Contemporaneous with these political developments\textsuperscript{96}, the then First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill,\textsuperscript{97} learned of Weizmann’s discovery of synthetic acetone through his munitions advisor Sir Frederick Nathan\textsuperscript{98} in February 1915. \textsuperscript{99,100} By isolating the bacterium \textit{Clostridium\textsuperscript{101} acetobutylicum,} \textsuperscript{102} later re-named ‘the \textit{Weizmann organism,}’ Weizmann was able to convert starches (using corn fermentation) to a mixture of ethanol, acetone,\textsuperscript{103} and butyl alcohol.\textsuperscript{104} In March of 1915 Churchill\textsuperscript{105} asked if Weizmann could industrialize the discovery,\textsuperscript{107} and on being assured that it could be done, Churchill encouraged Weizmann’s research by provided facilities for further experimentation.\textsuperscript{108} By May of 1915 Weizmann was able to demonstrate that his anaerobic fermentation process could convert 100 tons of grain to 12 tons of acetone. Lloyd George,\textsuperscript{109} now munitions minister,\textsuperscript{110} followed Churchill\textsuperscript{111} in supporting Weizmann’s efforts. \textsuperscript{112} On May 25, 1915 two and a half months after Weizmann was retained to test the process, Churchill was replaced as First Lord of the Admiralty by Lord Balfour. The very same day Lloyd George was appointed to head the newly created Ministry of Munitions. Later the two departments jointly obtained laboratory facilities for Weizmann at the Lister Institute and secured access to a jointly funded industrial plant for production.\textsuperscript{113}

In early 1916\textsuperscript{114} after the pilot plant was completed, industrial-scale production of acetone began. Almost 3000 tons\textsuperscript{115} gallons of acetone were produced the first year, eventually totaling 30,000 tons by the end of the war. As a result of Weizmann’s efforts,\textsuperscript{116} shell production rose from 500,000 in the first five months of the war to 16.4 million in 1915. By 1917, thanks to the new munitions factories, the British Empire was supplying more than 50 million shells a year. By war’s end, the British Army had fired 170 million shells.\textsuperscript{117} By 1916 Weizmann’s position in the British government was ‘regularized." According to some accounts,\textsuperscript{118,119} Lloyd George named Weizmann Director of the British Munitions Laboratories.\textsuperscript{120} Weizmann lost no time in parlaying the appointment and his elevated political stature into a platform advocating the creation of a Jewish Home. Lloyd-George writes of his first meeting with Weizmann in that related to Zionism which occurred in 1916\textsuperscript{121}, noting that Weizmann “explained his aspirations as to the repatriation of the Jews to the sacred land they had made famous. That was the fount and origin of the famous declaration about the National Home for the Jews in Palestine.... As soon as I became Prime Minister I talked the whole matter over with Mr Balfour, who was then Foreign Secretary.” \textsuperscript{122}

Lloyd George became Prime Minister in December of 1916. Shortly thereafter, he made good on his promise to re-introduce Weizmann to Balfour. At this point Weizmann and Balfour began to meet regularly, “strolling around Whitehall at night and discussing how a Jewish homeland would serve, by the quirks of fate, the interests of historical justice and British power”. \textsuperscript{123} Weizmann again wasted no efforts in bringing his Zionist passion to bear.\textsuperscript{124} The historian Tom Segev relates how, one night, Balfour and Weizmann walked backwards and forwards for two hours, after the latter had dined with Balfour: “The Zionist movement spoke, Weizmann said, with the vocabulary of modern statesmanship, but was fuelled by a deep religious consciousness. Balfour himself, a modern statesman, also considered Zionism as an inherent part of his Christian faith. It was a beautiful night; the moon was out. Soon after, Balfour declared in a Cabinet meeting, "I am a Zionist.”\textsuperscript{125, 126, 127}
From 1916 to 1917 Weizmann continued his work at the British Admiralty laboratories and became an honorary adviser to the British Ministry of Supply, doing research on synthetic rubber and high-octane gasoline also needed for the war effort, allowing for continued contact with Lloyd George.

In this light, the regard (and gratitude) of Lloyd George takes on additional significance, and the superlatives he heaps on Weizmann ("one of the greatest Hebrews of all time") becomes understandable. As Lloyd George notes, Weizmann "found his opportunity in this War of Nations to advance the cause to which he had consecrated his life. Dr. Weizmann enlisted my adhesion to his ideals at a time when, at my request, he was successfully applying his scientific skill and imagination to save Britain from a real disaster over the failure of wood alcohol for the manufacture of cordite. In addition to the gratitude I felt for him for this service, he appealed to my deep reverence for the great men of his race who were the authors of the sublime literature upon which I was brought up. I introduced him to Mr. Balfour,128 who was won over completely by his charm, his persuasiveness and his intellectual power.129,130.

Weizmann’s efforts were persistent and targeted. By mid-1917, they were beginning to impact on key British players and without Weizmann’s on-the-scene presence and persistence it is doubtful the proclamation would have issued. However, it was not until at least three years after Weizmann’s initial acetone discovery that the resolution came to pass. By Weizmann’s account, it was his passionate Zionist stance that moved Balfour,131 while the eminently grateful Lloyd-George claims that he who "was a prime supporter and even force majeure in encouraging Balfour’s efforts." Lloyd George writes, "During the summer of 1917, Mr. Balfour, with my zealous assent as Prime Minister, entered into negotiations with Lord Rothschild on the subject of the Zionist aims." Ultimately it is recorded that the War Cabinet on September 3rd, 1917, "had under consideration correspondence which had passed between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Lord Rothschild on the question of the policy to be adopted towards the Zionist movement."132

The claims of Lloyd George appear only partially compatible with ensuing events. Lloyd George assumed the Prime Ministership on December 7, 1916 shortly after Weizmann’s stature was elevated in the British Admiralty Laboratories and almost a full year before The Balfour Declaration was signed.133 Nevertheless, the joint efforts of Weizmann, Lloyd George and Balfour surely were critical factors in the issuance of the Declaration.134

Revisionist History135

Regardless of the motive behind its implementation or its actual importance in leading to the statehood of Israel, most believe the psychological impact of The Declaration was enormous. This was the ember that ignited and then fanned the flames of the collective consciousness of Zionists. Certainly much credit for accomplishing this success belongs to Weizmann136 and thus Weizmann emerges as a powerful Zionist propagandist in the best sense of that word. As British Field Marshall Jan Christiaan Smuts137 always reminded his readers and listeners, "It was Weizmann who persuaded us."138
The importance of Weizmann’s scientific achievements in securing contact with Lloyd George and Lord Balfour – without which his influence could not have been felt-- cannot be underestimated. There does, however, seem to be some debate as to its significance in effectuating the Declaration itself. Some claim the declaration was in fact a *quid pro quo* for Weizmann’s discovery of acetone during a crucial period of the war. Others argue that the declaration was a brilliant piece of propaganda – one that aided the British war effort from a psychological perspective and that its purpose was intended to benefit Great Britain, at least in the main. In either case, Weizmann’s scientific contribution undoubtedly played a role in the rise of Lloyd-George’s personal star – one for which Lloyd George was be profoundly – and explicitly grateful. One does not bestow the accolade of being one of “the greatest Hebrews of all time” without a profound reason for doing so. Whether Lloyd George developed this high regard for Weizmann because of the impact Weizmann’s scientific discovery had on the standing of his country or his person, may be debated. What is unquestionable is that Weizmann did make an impact – and that his science was responsible for doing so.

If that is in fact the case, the importance of science (and scientists) as a diplomatic or propagandist tool first must be acknowledged and then utilized. Even those claiming that Weizmann’s contribution was not related to his scientific achievements must concede that it was only due to those achievements that he was taken seriously by Balfour (then in his capacity as First Lord of the Admiralty)-- and that he even secured an introduction to Lloyd George:

It must be recalled that Weizmann’s first meeting with Balfour occurred more than a decade before Declaration issued and that this first meeting was entirely unproductive. The meeting appeared not to have even made an impression on Balfour. ¹³⁹ Even before Weizmann’s first meeting with him, Balfour had entertained the notion of a Jewish homeland, offering the Jews Uganda as the venue as early as 1903. It was only after Balfour was introduced to Weizmann in 1915 (in Weizmann’s capacity as a scientist) ¹⁴⁰ that Balfour focused his attention on Weizmann’s Zionist message.

In the case of Lloyd George, the importance is even starker. Without Weizmann’s scientific contribution he could was not even gain an appointment -- simple access -- to Lloyd George. Sadly, this fact is obscured by what appears to be a good deal of revisionist history. Because the determining the importance of Weizmann’s scientific stature turns on when he was first able to secure a meeting with the future prime minister, the dating of that first meeting is crucial.

It is apparent from the notes and letters of the editor of the Manchester Guardian, CP Scott, that Scott (who enjoyed frequently (often weekly) meetings with Lloyd George – as well as having ‘his ear’) had been trying to make the introduction between Lloyd George and Weizmann as early as September of 1914 - unsuccessfully. These repeated – and concerted – efforts CP Scott throughout the fall of that year – as well as Weizmann using other channels to the same end-- did not bear fruit until *after* Weizmann had patented his acetone-fermentation process, advised the Munitions Ministry about it and was hired by them to utilize the process on a mass production basis.
Nevertheless, the biographers of both Scott and Weizmann go to great lengths to date of the first meeting between Lloyd George and Weizmann to January 15, 1915 or even earlier (to December 10), which proceeds Weizmann’s hiring by the Admiralty or the Munitions Ministry. There is, however, nothing that corroborates this view, save a garbled notation in Weizmann’s memoirs written years later and confusing claims by Weizmann’s biographers. Another fascinating (and hearsay) attempt to backdate this first contact with Lloyd George derives from letters of recommendation by Weizmann’s colleagues to Brandeis in July and November of 1915. These are set forth as two separate and conflicting hearsay accounts of Weizmann’s claim on the British elite. Neither rendition comports with verifiable data, and both even conflict with Weizmann’s own rendition. [see appendix 4 Chain of Custody for a parsing of the claims].

It appears Weizmann’s attempt to meet with Lloyd George and Balfour in 1914/early 1915 to re-propose his (political) Zionist ideas failed. Not until he was able to demonstrate his scientific prowess and contribute his scientific achievements to the benefit of the British War Office was he able to secure those meetings. The scientific breakthrough occurred sometime in 1915 and the meetings with Lloyd George and Balfour began in late 1915 and 1916, respectively:

1. The account of Lloyd George contradicts Weizmann’s date of the first meeting.
2. There is no official communication between Lloyd George and Weizmann or Scoot or having to do with Zionism before 1917.
3. The first meeting Weizmann and Scott claim to have had with Lloyd George (in December 1914 or January, 1915) also included Lord Samuel and Josiah Wedgewood. Lord Samuel’s papers do not support this.
4. Josiah Wedgewood’s own account of his first meeting with Weizmann indicates that it was at a breakfast hosted by Lloyd George – in December of 1916.
5. Records of the British National Archives, establish that Lloyd George had already met Weizmann several time before December 1916 that --beginning in June of 1915 - incident to Weizmann’s scientific work. Lloyd George, and was clearly informed – and impressed by the importance of Weizmann’s scientific contribution by the time they first discussed his Zionist activities. [See Appendix 2 which contains an annotated and composite timeline of the various sources together with supporting (or conflicting) corroboration from letters contained in the British National Archives].

According to the correspondences of Lloyd George as maintained in the British archives, Weizmann had his first meeting with Lloyd George in June of 1915 (incident to his scientific activities). That Weizmann’s biographers try to place the date of the first meeting regarding Zionism six months earlier, seems not so much an attempt to minimize the impact of Weizmann’s scientific contribution to the diplomatic process– but an attempt to minimize the importance of Herbert Samuel’s role and aggrandize Weizmann’s pre-eminence in influencing the British elite, thereby usurping Samuel’s importance. The misdating of the first meeting with Lloyd George, however, does not in any way detract from Weizmann’s ultimate accomplishment: marshalling the discordant array of British Zionists into one cohesive group with a united message for Sir Mark Sykes to parlay into a
formal Declaration by the Cabinet and the ability to articulate his passionate vision for the Holy Land so as to galvanize British supporters to enable its creation.

That Weizmann’s scientific achievements were responsible for his entree to Lloyd George is only highlighted by the repeated and failed efforts to make contact with Lloyd George before November 1915. The accomplishments of Weizmann become even more impressive when viewed in this light. Not only did he succeed in rendering critical assistance to the British War Effort, possibly turning the tide in favor of British success, not only did he demonstrate the importance of industrial fermentation as a scientific endeavor, but he succeeded to attain the respect of Lloyd George first for his scientific and then for his political prowess – resulting in issuance of the Balfour Declaration.

**What Weizmann Couldn’t Do**

The opinion that the major credit is due to Weizmann is not shared by all, although it is the view of historian Avi Shlaim. Other contenders for the credit are Lloyd George, Sir Mark Sykes and James Malcolm, the Armenian Representative to Britain. One school of thought attributes much of the credit to Justice Louis Brandeis and his colleague Justice Felix Frankfurter for their role in securing the support of President Wilson, a critical step before the Declaration was to be issued. The British insisted that Wilson’s public approval was a pre-requisite for the Doctrine and Wilson, the pacifist who campaigned for his second election on the slogan, “he kept us out of war,” was reluctant.

The importance of Weizmann’s efforts cannot be underestimated, regardless of who is afforded ultimate credit. Whether the document was a contract with American Jews, a vehicle for British war propaganda, or a reward for Weizmann’s scientific contribution, without Wilson’s eventual support, it would not have come about. And this obstacle, President Woodrow Wilson, was one even Weizmann, with all his prominence, could not address. While Weizmann had enough local recognition to influence the British government, his fame had not as yet spread to the United States. He had no direct ties to Wilson. There would have to be another means found to engineer and influence Wilson’s support. British insistence on securing Wilson’s support in the summer and fall of 1917 is curious. By the fall of 1917 when final negotiations over the Declaration’s wording were underway, the United States had already declared war – and had done so sixth months earlier.

Aware of the desire by the British for U.S. support of a Jewish homeland, Weizmann sought a backdoor past the notoriously anti-Semitic State Department, while the British Foreign Office wanted a direct route to the White House. As many have suggested, Weizmann and the British found that conduit in Justice Louis Brandeis, which is not surprising. Having supported Wilson since 1912, being of brilliant mind, sterling character, and intense loyalty, Brandeis was nominated to the Supreme Court by Wilson in 1916 and Wilson continued to seek his confidence and advice thereafter.

Thus on 8 April 1917, Weizmann, who was later to be responsible for Brandeis’ abandoning the International Zionist Organization altogether, cabled Brandeis advising that "an
expression of opinion coming from yourself and perhaps other gentlemen connected with the Government in favor of a Jewish Palestine under a British protectorate would greatly strengthen our hands." 149 It is important to recognize that at this point Weizmann had not met and likely not communicated directly with Brandeis.150 Nevertheless, Weizmann was influential on two fronts, working with Brandeis across the seas and from the shores of his own country- using the channels available and hospitable to him, in large measure because of his scientific accomplishments.

Brandeis' involvement, both in terms of word-smithing the document to address and assuage Wilson's concerns, and his negotiations with Wilson urging support were critical. Yet, the conversion of Brandeis, an avowed assimilationist until his mid-fifties and the nascence of the sudden desire to champion a cause he had heretofore rejected has never been fully investigated. Without Brandeis, it is doubtful Wilson would have come on board. The conversion of Brandeis to Zionism and the impact of his introduction to Lord Balfour which first occurs in April of 1917, remains to be addressed.

Appendices

Appendix 1:

2 November, 1917

_________________________________________________________

Foreign Office
November 2nd, 1917

Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.
Yours sincerely,
Arthur James Balfour: [WWI Document Archive > Official Papers > The Balfour Declaration]

**Appendix 2: Annotated and Composite Timeline (begins next page; legend below**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Prof. Wm Perkin; Sr Professor of Organic Chemistry at Manchester U hires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weizmann to assist him in contract work he had with Strange for production of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>synthetic rubber. Weizmann suggests enlisting August Fernbach dir of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fermentation Lab at Pasteur Institute to join the team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-1912</td>
<td>worked for Synthtic Products Co owned by Halford Strange; worked on fermentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Fernbach and Weizmann found bacterial mixture that would ferment potatoes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1911</td>
<td>They produce butyl alcohol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1911</td>
<td>Fernbach discovers (isolated) a bacteria (BF, Bacillus Fernbach)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1912</td>
<td>Mr Kane, mgr at Strange discovered that if BF was added to other starches it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yielded acetone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring 1912</td>
<td>Weizmann and Perkins disagree about the financial terms of the contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1912</td>
<td>Weizmann is fired by Perkins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1912-1913</td>
<td>Weizmann Works independently on butyl alchol production financed by his friend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jeous Simon. Appointed Reader at Manchester University. In November, 1913 asks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a friend, Moses Schoen, working for Strange to send more cultures. Schoen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>demurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 28-Nov 14, 1914</td>
<td>Strange demonstrates a new bacillus FBBBB discovered by Fernbach to Wm Rintoul, head of research at Nobel's Explosive's Company. Reports were disappointing according to Rintoul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 14, 1914</td>
<td>Weizmann meets CP Scott at party of one Mrs Eckhard, a friend of Dreyfuss; both of whom were benefactors of the Victoria Memorial Hospital where Vera Weizmann worked. CP Scott promises Weizmann to try to arrange a meeting with Lloyd George. [then Chancellor of the Exchequer; the reasoning behind the critical importance of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
arranging an introduction between him and Weizmann at this point that in time – two months before Samuel determines that Lloyd George has an interest in the matter-- see below- is obscure].

November 9, 1914: Samuel writes “I had an opportunity today of a brief talk with Lloyd George on the subject of a plan for a Jewish state in Palestine.” Lloyd George at a cabinet meeting had expressed “that he was very keen” to see a Jewish State founded in Palestine. p69.

November 12, 1914: Weizmann writes to Scott regarding Asquith’s speech.

November 15, 1914: Scott meets Weizmann in his office. p105

Nov 21, 1914 article in New Statesman, by AMH (Albert Montefiore Hyamson): “this has been the first time that the liquidation of Turkey... has become a definite prospect, and with Mr Asquith's words... the hopes of the Zionists have suddenly passed from an ideal into a matter of practical politics.” p. 70.

Nov 22, 1914: Scott writes to Weizmann promising to raise issue with Lloyd George on Friday.

Nov 27, 1914: Lloyd George meets with CP Scott who, "as a final point Scott raised the question of Palestine and the Zionists,... It was not quite new to him, Scott observed, no doubt with some surprise “as he had seen the article in the New Statesman and mentioned also that he had a... heart to heart conversation with Samuel and had been astonished to find out how that cold and dry person suddenly kindled and they had sympathized on the common ground of the small nationality.” p. 79. Scott returned to Manchester on Saturday and wrote to Weizmann on Sunday that he thought he could arrange for a meeting with Weizmann and Lloyd George the following Friday at 11 Downing St."

December 3, 1914 (Thursday): Weizmann prepares to meet Lloyd George the next day; receives telegram from Scott cancelling it and suggesting meeting on following Wednesday December 9.

December 9, 1914: Scott again cancels Lloyd George meeting and schedules one with Herbert Samuel for Dec 10. According to the papers of Chaim Weizmann, Weizmann claims that it was Lloyd George himself who cancelled and suggested the meeting with Samuel. P.123

Event #4554 Chaim Weizmann and Herbert Samuel meet in Samuel's office Date: Thursday, 10 Dec 1914 A long account, by Weizmann, of this meeting appears on pages 122-125 of this collection of Weizmann's papers; in this account, Weizmann does not give the date but Barnet Litvinoff, the editor of the collection, says, in note 7 on page 122, that it was on 10 December 1914.” PIWP database.

The date of the following letter date is not clear but is said to refer to the meeting claimed to have occurred either on December 10 1914 which included Lloyd George and Josiah Wedgwood as well as Herbert Samuel:

Dear Mr. Scott, [Ed.: C.P. Scott, the legendary editor of the Manchester Guardian, was a mutual friend of Chaim Weizmann and of then British Prime Minister David Lloyd George] I am leaving here at 4:15 this afternoon and if I don’t hear from you either here or in London at 12, Glenmore Road, Haverstock Hill NW, that I can see Mr. Lloyd George, I shall make no attempt to see him. I shall be in London until Saturday afternoon and any time until then
would suit me. Of course I indeed have in London also much work and a meeting could take place then, should we fail this week. But towards the end of next week I would like to proceed to France and Italy and it would be of great importance if I could have seen L.G. by then.... [emphasis supplied] (Weizmann had gone to Paris the prior week but only for a day – he did not go to Italy then and would not go to Italy until years later.)

The claim that the first meeting between Weizmann and Lloyd George occurred either in December 1914 or January 1915 is questionable and suspect. The importance of the date of the meeting bears on two issues: a desire to minimize the critical role of Herbert Samuels in initiating the interest of the British Cabinet in a Jewish Homeland in Palestine, and the derivative implication negating the importance of Weizmann’s scientific work as providing the initial entrée to Lloyd George upon which he used as a scaffold to advocate for the Jewish State.

The claim of the early date for the first meeting between Weizmann and Lloyd George derives from Scott and Weizmann’s own writings, including a garbled account written by Weizmann in his Memoirs years afterward indicating an imprecise recollection of events, and an undated letter contained in the Weizmann archives (see the following entry). [The only actual record of the meeting having actually transpired comes from Weizmann’s Book ‘Trial and Error,’ written years later]. Based on these indicia it is reported that,” CP Scott introduced Weizmann to Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, at a breakfast with Herbert Samuel and Josiah Wedgwood.” at which Weizmann says they discussed Zionism. 151. The impossibility of the date of this meeting is set forth below.

The letter referred to above which bears the purported date of December 10, 1914 and is found in the collected papers of Weizmann is introduced by the provenance recorded below:

“Transcribed by Jeanette Goldberg, edited by Gershom Martin. This letter (the facsimile carries no date) was written around 1914 to C.P.Scott of the Manchester Guardian, when Weizmann was trying to gain an introduction with then British Prime Minister David Lloyd-George.” [sic]

This introductory message itself indicates that the letter [which is found in its entirely in Appendix 5] was not written on the dated claimed and in fact calls into question the letter. 1/ it bears no date 2/it is transcribed from a ‘facsimile’, /3. The then Prime Minister was Lord Asquith. 4/ David Lloyd George was Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time and though he was later to become quite pivotal in the Balfour Declaration and Jewish State process – at this time , other than a passing interest expressed to Herbert Samuel, his influence was ancillary. These factors, along with confusion of the dates of the meeting along with Weizmann’s distinct lack of a clear recollection of the events and the failure to make a contemporaneous notation in his records or a send a letter of thank you to Scott, would support Lloyd George’s recollection that the first meeting occurred in November of 1915]. Sanders is of the opinion that this meeting occurred on Jan. 15 1915. Even this claim also not corroborated by independent sources. In all likelihood, the meeting that included Wedgwood did not occur until December, 1916.
According to Paul Mulvey, 152 Wedgwood’s biographer, Wedgwood met Weizmann in December 1916 “at one of Lloyd George’s breakfasts. Wedgwood was not to go public with his Zionism until Feb 1, 1917 in a letter to the Manchester Guardian. Wedgwood, himself, claims his Zionism arose in late 1916 at a meeting with Neil Primrose and Rufus Isaacs, and possibly James Rothschild. This would corroborate Lloyd George’s recollection that the first meeting did not occur until June of 1915 at the earliest, and that the first time the two spoke about Zionist matters was in November of 1915. The earliest recorded correspondence we have between the two is dated May 21 1917.153

Further indicating confusion on the part of Weizmann CP Scott or Weizmann’s biographers are notations found in:

The PWIP data base (Palestine Information with Provenance PIWP database. The quotes from the data base includes both entries from Weizmann’s papers and PIWP’s commentary are written in black and contained within the yellow boxed entries.

http://cosmos.ucc.ie/cs1064/jahowen/IPSC/php/event.php?eid=4605 The green bolded type are supplied by the author to call attention to various anomalies.]

Event #4605 Weizmann, CP Scott, Lloyd George, Herbert Samuel and Josiah Wedgwood meet for breakfast
Date: Thursday, 3 Dec 1914
“Weizmann describes this breakfast on page 150 of his memoirs. He says that on 3 December 1914, he had breakfast with Herbert Samuel, David Lloyd George, C P Scott and Josiah Wedgwood.” This entry patently contradicts CP Scott’s letter of December 3 saying on that date he was cancelling the meeting arranged for that date.

“there may be some confusion. In note 7 on page 122 of this collection of Weizmann’s papers, Barnet Litvinoff says that Samuel accompanied Weizmann to a breakfast with Lloyd George on 15 January 1915, but does not mention the 3 December 1914 breakfast. Did Weizmann meet Lloyd George twice for breakfast in the space of six weeks? Or is Weizmann wrong in his memoir? Or is Litvinoff wrong?”[emphasis supplied].

Between November and January Herbert Samuel is writing a position paper on Palestine–which he submits to Lord Grey – calling for a Jewish state in Palestine under British protection.

Event #1644 Herbert Samuel submits a draft cabinet memorandum advocating establishment of Jewish state in Palestine under British protection.

Date: Monday, 25 Jan 1915: A few weeks after he confided his support of Zionism in a conversation with Edward Grey on 9 November 1914, Herbert Samuel submits a draft cabinet memorandum advocating establishment of Jewish state in Palestine under British protection.

“Samuel was prompted to act by his alarm at the fact that, on 7 January, the acting British High Commissioner in Egypt sent a telegram to London which indicated that a large
proportion of the population of Syria and Palestine would welcome arrival of British and urged a military offensive, with a landing in Alexandretta, implying creation of an Arab area under British protection. He submitted a revised memorandum in March 1915

December 12, 1914: Weizmann meets for second time with Lord Balfour (The first was in 1906) Balfour was a friend of the Sassoons (to whom James Malcolm contends he arranged for Weizmann to meet). "Balfour asked “if Weizmann wanted anything practical at present, and Weizmann said that, as long as the guns were roaring, all he wanted was to explain to him how great and deep is the blood stained tragedy of the Jews," and that he hoped to call on him again when the military situation became clearer. P121.

December 25, 1914: Weizmann visits Samuel with Dr Gastner then formally head of the Jewish Community; chief Sephardic Rabbi, known by both Samuel and later Sykes.

SOMETIME IN 1914 Weizmann discovers a (Bacillus) later named Clostridium acetobutylicum Weizmann because it assumed that shape as a spore-producer. [Weizmann does not mention this discovery in his letter of introduction to Scott, ostensibly dated December 1914, but more likely dated September, shortly after he met Scott for the first time.]

1915

January 11, 1915: Weizmann’s papers claim he receives a letter from Samuel regarding a meeting he’s arranged with him and Lloyd George on January 15 for breakfast.

January 15, 1915: Sanders claims Weizmann meets Lloyd George for the first time based on a hazy recollection in Weizmann’s Memoirs written years later, at which Weizmann doesn’t remember much of what happened other than Lloyd George firing questions about Palestine and the number of Jews currently there and how many could the country absorb. Weizmann says he was shy and confused “and flip”. Lloyd George has no recollection of any meeting prior to June 6, 1915 (which was purely incident to the Shell crisis). Sanders asserts that it is Lloyd George’s recollection which is at fault thereby allowing for Lloyd George to be free “from any commitment to Zionism until after it was brought to him by ‘a brilliant chemist who did war work for him.” 154

January 28, 1915: Samuel writes report of five specific arguments in favor of policy favoring a Jewish home from the standpoint of British interests which is read by Asquith regarding the “British annexation of Palestine.” p 135

Early 1915: William Rintoul receives a letter from Chaim Weizmann (who wrote at the suggestion of Prof. Harold Dixon) informing him of his process.

Feb 9, 1915: Rintoul visits Weizman’s laboratory, examines process and advises Weizmann to apply for a patent. See also Sanders p. 186. [This is the first ‘independent’ corroboration of the date of Weizmann’s discovery.]

March 15, 1915: Weizmann signs a contract with Rintoul (Nobel Labs); Rintoul advises a former manager at Nobel, Sir Frederick Nathan155 (now at the Admiralty under Churchill), of Weizmann’s discovery.
March 29, 1915: Weizmann applies for a provisional patent and submits a full patent application October, 1915. (The patent papers say Frederick Nathan advised Weizmann to seek the patent).

April 19, 1915: Strange signs contract with the British government to produce acetone.

April 21, 1915: Weizmann met Nathan in London and agreed to carry out large-scale trials for the Admiralty. He defers question of remuneration or royalties until after the War, except for expenses and to hire Harold Davies as an assistant.

From the National Archives of Great Britain: Chaim Weizmann, 41 Campden House Road, Kensington, Winston Churchill, to Sir Frederick (Black) LG/D/10/1/18 27 Feb 1916
Contents: Describes how the Admiralty sponsored his acetone process as early as April, 1915 and appointed him, 1st Sep 1915, as temporary honorary Technical Advisor on acetone supplies. ...

April 30, 1915: Weizmann begins experimental work at Bromley under grant of the Treasury Emergency Standing Committee.
May 12, 1915: Nathan authorizes an agreement with Weizmann. Takes Weizmann to meet Churchill.

May 25, 1915: Churchill dismissed from Admiralty; replaced by Lord Balfour.
[per Sanders, during the course of Balfour's tenure at Admiralty, he communicates with Weizmann on only two occasions].

May 25, 1915: Lloyd George becomes Minister of Munitions.
June 3, 1915: Scott writes to Weizmann saying he brought Weizmann's invention to Lloyd George. Scott says that Lloyd George 'has a very clear impression of Weizmann's personality” and remembers CW “warmly.” [apparently Scott writes to Weizmann before meeting Lloyd George on the 6th, see below]

June 6, 1915: CP Scott sees Lloyd George and talks to him about Weizmann. Scott writes in his diary: “Lloyd George seemed interested and took me to see Dr Christopher Addison, Parliamentary Secretary to Ministry of Munitions.” But compare Sanders account: Wednesday June 9, 1915: Scott meets with Lloyd George who asks him about Weizmann and brought Scott back to talk to Christopher Addison, the parliamentary undersecretary of the Munitions Ministry who appeared less impressed with Weizmannn's qualifications but never the less "took him on." (Sanders p 106). [Sanders’ account is at odds with records in the National Archives, below]:

June 6, 1915: C.P.Scott, The Firs, to Lloyd George LG/D/18/15/2 6 June 1915 Parliamentary Archives Suggests that if Lloyd George is seeing Weizmann the next day, he should ask him about the War Office contract "with a certain company" for the manufacture of acetone, as they are spending about £20,000 on a process originally devised by Weizmann, now worthless. Refers to Weizmann's offer of his new process to the War Office, which the Admiralty are now developing. Suggests that Weizmann would be useful in organising chemical works, owing to his familiarity with German methods.
June 7, 1915: Weizmann meets Lloyd George for the first time, it would seem. “The entire interview lasted only a few minutes and Weizmann did not even have a chance to properly discuss the acetone process” All he could do was convey need to mobilize French and Swiss scientists to help. Weizmann offered to go himself and hire the best men. “Lloyd George nodded in approval and hurried on to his next appointment.” (Sanders p. 195)

June 9, 1915 Weizmann writes memo of key points of process. Weizmann relates that Lloyd George is unconcerned that Weizmann had already handed over the process to the Admiralty and instructed Lord Moulton to contact Weizmann and arrange “tie him [Weizmann] to the Munitions Ministry. (Sanders writes that Weizmann spoke to Lloyd George’s secretary, Humbert Wolfe, about the process and Weizmann told Wolfe to deal with the Admiralty.)

July 28 1915: Pilot plant built for Weizmann's work at the Nicholson gin factory and large trials [for the Admiralty] are successfully completed.

July 19, 1915: Weizmann writes to Scott that he asked Nathan for the Admiralty to recognize the success of the experiments by “giving [me] a certain status; This should not involve necessarily any payments.’ And that Nathan agreed and promise to consider the matter in a few days. He also “wanted similar recognition from the Ministry of Munitions” writing to Scott.”

August, 1915: Nobel plant destroyed by fire from TNT explosion; Rintoul asks Weizmann to release Nobel from the contract; Weizmann immediately does so. Plant reopens in October. [Notes in the British Archive reveal that Sir Frederick Nathan suspects arson. This would give a different gloss to Lord Moulton’s refusal to allow Weizmann to travel to France at this time other than the commonly presumed xenophobia or anti-Semitism.]

August 23, 1915: The first large scale experiments for Ministry of Munitions are completed and approved by Lord Moulton, Director-General of Explosives Supply under Minister Lloyd George.

Chaim Weizmann, 41 Campden House Road, Kensington, Winston Churchill, to Sir Frederick (Black) LG/D/10/1/18 27 Feb 1916 Contents: Describes how the Admiralty sponsored his acetone process as early as April, 1915 and appointed him, 1st Sep 1915, as temporary honorary Technical Advisor on acetone supplies. Notes that the Ministry of Munitions only became interested in him in August, 1915 and appointed him, in Sep 1915, Chemical Advisor on Acetone Supplies. Thinks his position not sufficiently regularised. Stresses the importance of his process.

September, 1915: Admiralty decides to set up experimental station at the Royal Naval Cordite Factory at Holton Heath.

Weizmann is made “Temporary Honorary Technical Advisor to the Admiralty on Acetone Supplies.” with a grant of 2000 lbs. a year for two years.

Weizmann is appointed ‘Chemical Advisor to the Ministry of Munitions on Acetone Supplies” with a salary of 1500 pounds and 500 pounds for expenses. His research was to be conducted henceforth at the Lister Institute in London at the joint expense of the Admiralty and the Munitions Ministry.

Professor Harold Dixon [who first called Rintoul’s attention to Weizmann’s work] becomes Deputy Inspector of High Explosives for the Manchester area, for which service he was made a Commander of The Most Excellent Order of the British Empire

21

Reports finding works capable of turning out LG/2/3 tons of picric acid a day; could produce more if supplied with phenol. No difficulty about exportation. Recent consignments sent to France. Minuted in Miss Stevenson's hand: "Copy of extract sent to Mr. Bazire.LG/29/10".

**Weizmann moves to London; takes leave of absence from U of Manchester.**

**November 11, 1915** C.P. Scott, The First, to Mr. (sic Miss) Stevenson.
Typescript **LG/D/18/15/6 11 Nov 1915** These documents are held at Parliamentary Archives Will see Weizmann the next day and obtain full information. Either Weizmann or he will call on Lloyd George on Saturday

**November 14, 1915**: Moulton is continuing to cause Weizmann difficulties and Scott speaks to Lloyd George about it.

Nov 26, 1915: Weizmann, Samuel and Scott have lunch with Lloyd George. See also Sanders p 290. This is the first time that Lloyd George talks to Weizmann about anything other than chemistry- i.e. the Palestine question. Not much was accomplished at this meeting, though, because Scott was more concerned with the unfair treatment Weizmann was getting from Lord Moulton at the Ministry. Later the conversation turned to Palestine when Lloyd George asked Weizmann, "how many colonists the Jews expected to supply and Weizmann said he thought half a Million in 50 years. “ Lloyd George evidently thought this a small number” p. 293. Both Lloyd George’s memoirs and the papers of Josiah Wedgewood put this date in December of 1916. Also, the issues raised at this meeting are curiously virtually identical to the issues that Weizmann claims were discussed at the first meeting he had with Lloyd George in December of 1914 (or January of 1915)>

December 1 and 2, 1916 C. P. Scott, The Firs, to Lloyd George **LG/D/18/15/8 2 Dec 1915** These documents are held at Parliamentary Archives Is sending Weizmann’s letter, to be treated as confidential, in order to show that Weizmann's position under Moulton is untenable and that conditions must be altered if Lloyd George is to obtain the supply of acetone. Things would work differently under a man like Sir F. Nathan.

Enclosure: Chaim Weizmann, 3 Justice Walk, S.W., to Mr. Scott Typescript copy 1 Dec 1915 Moulton’s objections to his going to France and Switzerland after his agreement in August. Complains that his acetone process is being entrusted to an amateur. Neither he nor Nathan understands what is going on. Asks for advice.

**Lloyd George, to Lord Moulton. LG/D/10/1/14 3 Dec 1915** These documents are held at Parliamentary Archives

Explains his uneasiness about the supply of propellants and his decision to reconstruct the dept. by either organising a branch in Moulton’s office or separating the supply of propellant explosives from the Explosives Supply Dept. and creating a new organisation. Asks for Moulton’s views.
Moulton, Storey's Gate, to Lloyd George. **LG/D/10/1/15** 3 Dec 1915 **These documents are held at Parliamentary Archives**

Lord Moulton: Repudiates charge that he is responsible for failure to keep promise to the Admiralty to erect a Gun Cotton factory at Queensferry. Says that neither Balfour nor Sir Frederick Black would have allowed the charge to have been made. Also exonerates Churchill from blame, as he “would be ignorant of what happened at the Admiralty after he had left it”. Enclosure: Memo. by Moulton as to the arrangements with the Admiralty for the construction of the Factory at Queensferry. 6pp Typescript 3 Dec 1915

**Mid January, 1916**: trials at the Royal Naval Cordite factory satisfactorily completed. The Admiralty builds its own plant for production at Poole. Starts operation 1917 under Capt Desborough, 1916

R. Sothen Holland, Dept. of Explosives Supplies, to Mr. Davies. **LG/D/10/1/17** 28 Jan 1916 **These documents are held at Parliamentary Archives Contents**: Dr. Weizmann is satisfied with arrangements already made for him to work out the process initiated by Rintoul, Nobel’s chief chemist, for production of Toluol from Petrol. Minuted by J.T.Davies.

**February, 1916**: Weizmann is working on converting butyl alcohol to benzene and toluene for the Ministry of Munitions but by the time the process was ready, there was no further need of it; His process of converting butyl alcohol to methy-ethyl-ketone is still being used by the Admiralty in the Cordite plant.

Chaim Weizmann, 41 Campden House Road, Kensington, Winston Churchill, to Sir Frederick (Black) **LG/D/10/1/18** 27 Feb 1916 **Contents**: Describes how the Admiralty sponsored his acetone process as early as April, 1915 and appointed him, 1st Sep 1915, as temporary honorary Technical Advisor on acetone supplies. Notes that the Ministry of Munitions only became interested in him in August, 1915 and appointed him, in Sep 1915, Chemical Advisor on Acetone Supplies. Thinks his position not sufficiently regularised. Stresses the importance of his process.

**February 17, 1916**: Weizmann writes to Nathan (who has now moved over to the Munitions Ministry) that his status “is not commensurate with his substantial accomplishment.” [curiously this letter seems to include a copy to Winston Churchill, who by now has long been gone from the Admiralty].

C.P.Scott, St. Pancras Hotel, to Lloyd George. **LG/D/18/15/9** 29 Feb 1916 **These documents are held at Parliamentary Archives** Strongly advocates Fisher's return to the Admiralty. Balfour must go if he cannot work with Fisher The Cabinet must realise this the next day; if […] not, the Prime Minister should be pressed through independent poers and oven a threat of a motion for a secret commission of inquiry. Lloyd George the one Independent man in the Cabinet; McKenna, though alive to the situation, is not likely to stake all on this issue. [http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/SearchUI]

**March, 1916**: Munitions Ministry decides to make acetone on very large scale using Weizmann’s process. Work begins in six distilleries. Lawsuit over patent between Strange and Weizmann heats up. Lord Moulton is not pleased.
April 5, 1916: Nathan (now employed at Munitions Ministry) writes that now that acetone is to be produced in large scale, they would be produced by a separate branch of the Department of Explosive Supplies at the Ministry of Munitions and Weizman was to be named “Supt of the Lister Institute Govt Laboratories in charge of research work and bacteria preparation and training and have status of technical advisor on all scientific and experimental work relating to production of acetone.”

March 14, 1916: Strange’s process is a complete failure. The factory of the Synthetic Products Company is taken over by the government and turned over for exclusive use of Weizmann’s process using corn instead of the Strange’s process using potatoes.

A. Bazire, Dept. of Explosives Supplies, to Davies. LG/D/10/1/20 13 May 1916
Contents: Says that Lord Moulton has approved of the Acetone Memo. Enclosure: (a) Minute from Moulton. Typescript 13 May 1916
The progress of Weizmann’s research.
(b) Two Memos. by F.L.Nathan. Typescript 12 May 1916
The production of acetone by the Weizmann Process and the provision of experimental plant.

Ch. Weizmann, Admiralty Laboratories, to Mr. Davies. LG/D/10/1/21 25 May 1916
These documents are held at Parliamentary Archives Enclosure: Ch. Weizmann, Admiralty Laboratories, to Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George. Typescript 25 May 1916
Refers to their interview that morning and states that he is proceeding with arrangements for continuing the experiments for the conversion of ordinary spirits into benzene and toluene and therefore into picric acid.

April 1915 CW summoned by Frederick Nath Ch. Weizmann, Admiralty Laboratories, to Mr. Davies. LG/D/10/1/21 25 May 1916
These documents are held at Parliamentary Archives Enclosure: Ch. Weizmann, Admiralty Laboratories, to (Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George). Typescript 25 May 1916
Refers to their interview that morning and states that he is proceeding with arrangements for continuing the experiments for the conversion of ordinary spirits into benzene and toluene and therefore into picric acid.

May 30, 1916: Weizmann insists to Moulton that the acetone process was his. Moulton is pressuring Weizmann to accept arbitration. He apparently succeeds.

End July: Govt changes; Lloyd George becomes prime minister; Balfour becomes foreign secretary.


February, 1917: Two of the distilleries were producing 228 tons of acetone a month.

February, 1917: Weizmann now uses horse- chestnuts and acorns when Ministry of Food outlawed use of corn.

Process terminated –to lack of need. Weizmann turns his attention full time to the Palestine question and his Zionist activities.

July 1917: Special compensation committee determines Weizmann’s award.
Appendix 4: Chain of Contact

According to Reinharz (in the English Historical Review:)

A Letter to Brandeis (dated July 9, 1915) by HM Kallen (who was not so fond of Weizmann’) quoting from letter of AE Zimmern of the political intelligence dept of the Foreign office spoke of the high importance of Weizmann in political circles: saying that Weizmann has succeeded in interesting ‘young Mrs. James Rothschild who introduced him to Baron and Marchioness of Crewe and through the latter to Lord Grey (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until 1916) and Lloyd George.

I. From IL Kandel who reported in autumn of 1915 that Weizmann was ‘shouldering the whole burden of developing a sentiment for Zionism among the leaders of English politics “through CP Scott who introduced him to Lloyd George and then passed him on to Herbert Samuel (postmaster General) who gave him favorable hearing. Mr. Balfour was next reached and was much impressed. Kandel wrote this letter to Horace Kallen on November 19, 1915. Reinharz does note the inconsistency in the renditions of Kallen and Zimmern. But correctly points out that both versions point to an increasing influence and importance of Weizmann. In fact, neither of the versions reported to Brandeis appear to be correct. Nevertheless, Reinharz’s ultimate conclusion still remains valid: regardless of the manner in which Weizmann succeeded to reach Lloyd George -- by November of 1915 he has succeeded in establishing a connection with Lloyd George that transcends his scientific contribution and relates to Zionism. Nevertheless, for the purpose of determining the role Weizmann’s scientific contribution played in his securing the entrée to Lloyd George, and eventually his trust and confidence in political matters, it is important to parse out the how and when of Weizmann’s sudden and stellar ascent in the esteem of Balfour and Lloyd George.

II> According to Weizmann himself, 156 he first contacted Mrs Rothschild after meeting Samuel. Weizmann claims he contacted Mrs Rothschild in November of 1914, when he only met Samuel in December, 1914. The ‘very favorable opinion’ Weizmann refers to was in regard to Mrs Rothschild enquiring of Baron Crewe (to whom she was related) whether that gentleman would be willing ‘to take any action at present.’ 157 According to Colin Schindler it appears that Lord Samuel was in contact with Lord Grey regarding the issue in question about the same time that Weizmann contacted Dorothy Rothschild158 and certainly as early as November 9, 1914, giving Samuel precedence in raising the issue with the British government. Sometime thereafter Mrs Rothschild introduced Weizmann to Lady Crewe and to Theo Russel, the private secretary of Lord Grey.159 There is no indication that she introduced Weizmann to Lord Grey himself, and Grey’s position was not nearly as definitive as the others at that time. While Zionism had a strong sentimental attraction for Lord Grey 160 his colleagues, including his cousin Edwin Montagu, did not give him

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much encouragement. Nevertheless, he worked with Lloyd George and Samuel to produce a revised text of Samuel’s January memo to the Cabinet in the middle of March 1915.\textsuperscript{161}

The initial and initiating contacts with Lord Grey regarding a Jewish Home in Palestine seem to have been the province of Lord Samuel. As early as the outset of WWI (July 1914) Samuel had suggested the idea to him.\textsuperscript{162} This outreach continued through 1915. \textit{(It would therefore appear that Lord Samuel already had a profound influence on Lord Grey long prior to Weizmann’s first meeting with him – the exact date of which remains undocumented, other than to say it appears not to have occurred before 1916 at the earliest.)} In January 1915 Samuel produced a Zionist memorandum on Palestine after discussions with Weizmann and Lloyd George. It contained arguments in favor of combining British annexation of Palestine with British support for Zionist aspirations, and ended with objections to any other solution.\textsuperscript{53} Samuel circulated it to his colleagues in the Cabinet. Lloyd George was already a Zionist “partisan”; Lord Haldane, to whom Weizmann had had access, wrote expressing a friendly interest; \textsuperscript{54} though privately expressing Zionist sympathies, the Marquess of Crewe presumably did not express any views in the Cabinet on the memorandum; Prime Minister Asquith wrote: "I confess that I am not attracted by the proposed addition to our responsibilities, but it is a curious illustration of Dissy’s favorite maxim that race is everything to find this almost lyrical outburst proceeding from the well-ordered and methodical brain of H.S." \textsuperscript{57} \textsuperscript{163} [bracketed notes refer to notes in the original which document the footnotes supporting these claims, mainly references to Samuel’s papers. See also note 56.]

Only by late 1916 did the limelight begin to focus on Weizmann, \textsuperscript{164} in no small measure because Sir Mark Sykes had taken on the mantle of effectuating the Declaration and needed a cohesive position by the Jewish community, which was in a state of major disarray. [It is interesting to note that at this time Weizmann’s scientific responsibilities both at the Ministry of Munitions and at the Admiralty were waning]. Weizmann’s major contribution, in addition to fanning the imaginations of Lloyd George and Lord Balfour beginning in late-1915 was to provide a united Zionist position on behalf of British Jewry for Sykes to shepherd through the Cabinet.

Clearly, Zimmern’s rendition of the chronology of events was spurious. But if Zimmern was in error, Kallen was even more so. There can be no doubt that meeting Samuel pre-dated Weizmann’s meeting with Lloyd George (the Memoirs of Weizmann himself attest to this, and Samuel’s writings corroborate it) and first contact with Balfour occurred nearly a decade earlier. Further, according to Sanders, even as Minister of the Admiralty, \textit{25 May 1915 – 10 December 1916} Balfour was only in contact with Weizmann just twice. Only after Balfour became Foreign Minister (and Sykes appeared on the scene) was Weizmann to have an important impact on Balfour.
Appendix 5: The claimed basis

The following is contained in the archives of the Weizmann Institute and used to support the notion that Weizmann’s first meeting with Lloyd George occurred in December 1914. Presumably the letter was written in preparation for a meeting with Lloyd George, although since Weizmann has not detailed the discovery of Bacillus Weizmann, this must have been written sometime in very late 1914 or early 1915 at the earliest.

“Letter by Chaim Weizmann to C.P. Scott, c. 1914 from the Weizmann Institute Department of Chemistry internet page.

“Transcribed by Jeanette Goldberg, edited by Gershom Martin. This letter (the facsimile carries no date) was written around 1914 to C.P.Scott of the Manchester Guardian, when Weizmann was trying to gain an introduction with then British Prime Minister David Lloyd-George.” [sic]

(Note the error in the date of Lloyd-George's prime ministership. He did not become prime minister until 1916.)

Dear Mr. Scott, [Ed.: C.P. Scott, the legendary editor of the Manchester Guardian, was a mutual friend of Chaim Weizmann and of then British Prime Minister David Lloyd George]

I am leaving here at 4:15 this afternoon and if I don’t hear from you either here or in London at 12, Glenmore Road, Haverstack Hill NW, that I can see Mr. Lloyd George, I shall make no attempt to see him. I shall be in London until Saturday afternoon and any time until then would suit me. Of course I indeed have in London also much work and a meeting could take place then, should we fail this week. But towards the end of next week I would like to proceed to France and Italy and it would be of great importance if I could have seen L.G. by then.

I think it is only right that I should submit to you a brief statement about my own person.

I have studied chemistry in Charlottenburg [Ed.: at the Kaiserliche Technische Hochschule, presently the Technische Universität Berlin], took my degree of Sc. D. in Freiburg (Switzerland) [Ed.: also Fribourg: not to be confused with Freiburg, Germany], then became a Privat-Dozent in Geneva under Prof. C. Graebe - one of the fathers of organic synthetic chemistry. After having worked with him for four years both teaching and research I came here ten years ago. I became a lecturer in Org. Chemistry and was Professor Perkin's assistant for many years, conducting both teaching and research in his laboratories. Most of the vacations I spent in the Pasteur Institute, where I work at Biological Chemistry. Prof. Perkin, as you know, left this University for Oxford two years ago. In the same time the Council considered it necessary to develop the subject of Biochemistry here and a small Department was created and I was put in charge of it. In view of the fact that this subject is new and the beginning comparatively small, no Professorship was created but a Readership [Ed.: a Reader in the Uk is roughly equivalent to an Associate Professor in the US.]. The course of Chemistry of dyestuffs was also handed over to me as I have work on
this subject for a good many years. Profs. Schuster and Dixon would willingly bear out those statements. I have published a fair amount of papers in the chemical journals and on the strength of my research, the Degree of D.Sc. of this University was awarded to me and my name is at present up for the Fellowship of the Royal Society.

I am in the Zionist movement since I was 15 and at present I am a member of our Executive. I was born in 1874 in Motol (Province of Grovno, Russia).

Yours very sincerely, MChaim Weizmann

1 Department of Organic Chemistry, Weizmann Institute of Science http://www.weizmann.ac.il/Organic_Chemistry/weizlab.shtml


4 Einstein rejected the offer to become the second president of Israel, feeling that he did not have the requisite temperament nor experience in dealing with relationships. However, it is precisely this mien as a scientist that made Einstein a very attractive candidate for the role. Of his [scientific] mindset, Einstein writes in a letter posthumously delivered to Abba Eban, the Israeli representative to the United Nations, “I am deeply moved by the offer from our State of Israel (to serve as President), and at once saddened and ashamed that I cannot accept it. All my life I have dealt with objective matters, hence I lack both the natural aptitude and the experience to deal properly with people and to exercise official functions.” [Emphasis supplied].

5 A quote by Albert Einstein is illustrative: “Belief in an “objective reality has led to great scientific advances throughout the ages ... This belief is and always will remain the fundamental motive for all scientific creation.” Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld, “The Evolution of Physics: The Growth of Ideas from Early Concepts to Relativity and Quanta,” Cambridge University Press, 1938.

6 As Einstein wrote, “Anyone who doesn’t take truth seriously in small matters cannot be trusted in large ones either.”

7 The forward movement of science is not merely a function of the dispassionate assessment of scientific research, but the product of passionate scientists who become convinced of the merits of their work. When changing current paradigms, the degree of advocacy involved becomes immense. See Paul de Kruijf, “Microbe Hunters,” chapters on

8 Scientific revolutions, called paradigm shifts by Thomas Kuhn, require scientists to forge and accept a unified model of explanation for natural phenomena. “A paradigm is what members of a scientific community, and they alone, share” By contrast, Kuhn held that "a student in the humanities, unlike a normal [sic] scientist, has constantly before him a number of competing and incommensurable solutions to these problems, solutions that he must ultimately examine for himself.” See Thomas Kuhn, “The Essential Tension,” University of Chicago Press 1962- 1977. In essence, Kuhn is stating that these competing world views result in political impasse as each side must acknowledge the validity of alternative views. The ensuing discord results from subjective and hence idiosyncratic concerns that shape the views and perspectives of the student of humanities.

9 Science, of course, is forward moving; the scientific revolution being the mechanism wherein the previously held scientific consensus is amended, if not rejected entirely, and a new collective viewpoint is embraced. Kuhn’s view is that scientists are required to accept this unified consensus of scientific theory – but just until enough ‘objective’ evidence is put forth to enable the scientific community to view the very same information relied on earlier to form new scientific consensus.” Thomas Kuhn, “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,” University of Chicago Press, 1962. Kuhn used the “duck-rabbit optical illusion” to demonstrate the cognitive mechanism whereby this collective mind-shift occurs. In this optical illusion the image as a whole switches back and forth from being a duck then being a rabbit. Gestalt psychologists use this illustration to explain why the figure and ground are reversible.

10 Several countries, including India, China and Israel do have Ministries of Science, which have led to measurable gains in technology in the years following their establishment. The effect of these Ministries on foreign policy successes is outside the scope of this article.


“Benjamin Franklin: First American Diplomat, 1776-1785,” Benjamin Franklin, the most distinguished scientific and literary American of his age, was the first American diplomat.” From the Office of the Historian U.S. Department of State. http://history.state.gov/milestones/1776-1783/BFranklin


When Thomas Jefferson succeeded Franklin in 1785, the French Foreign Minister, Vergennes, asked: "It is you who replace Dr. Franklin?" Jefferson replied, "No one can replace him, Sir; I am only his successor."

The role of Aaron Aaronsohn, agronomist, hydrologist, cartographer and geologist, in abetting issuance of the Balfour Declaration, aiding British intelligence and thereby furthering the British war effort, and drafting the original borders of Palestine as incorporated into the Sevres Peace Treaty of 1919 has been studiously ignored and is the subject of the companion article.


“The Balfour Declaration,” in the words of Prof. H. M. V. Temperley, was a "definite contract between the British Government and Jewry" (History of the Peace Conference in Paris, vol. 6, p. 173). The main consideration given by the Jewish people (represented at the time the leader of the Zionist Organization) was their help in bringing President Wilson to the aid of the Allies. http://www.heretical.com/miscella/plandman.html


A letter entered in Herzl's diary as early as 15 May 1896 states that the head of the Armenian movement in London is the publisher Avetis Nazareth. The role of James Malcolm, the Armenian Representative to Britain in the issuance of the Balfour Declaration is the subject of debate. Much of the credit attributed to him seems to have arisen from an autobiographical speech given by Malcolm in London in 1944. (James Malcolm, “Origins of the Balfour Declaration: Dr. Weizmann's Contribution,” http://www.mailstar.net/malcolm.html). Much of what he says regarding his own contribution appears to be exaggerated and chronologically indefensible. It appears that Malcolm’s contribution may have been limited to orchestrating Weizmann’s introduction to Mark Sykes. (Even this claim that may be controverted by pure logic- surely Lord Balfour – who was well known to Sykes -- would have been in a position to do so years earlier than Malcolm’s arrival on the scene). Nevertheless, the archives of Weizmann do acknowledge
Malcolm’s support, if not contribution, to the cause. See Martin Halibian “The Zionism of James A. Malcolm, Armenian patriot,” by. Published 1962 Call Number: (9)04 HALL, located: Chaim Weizmann Archives.

22 First Aliyah Museum, Rechov HaNadiv, Zichron Yaakov, Israel.


24 Israel Ministry of Absorption, First Wave
http://www.moia.gov.il/English/FeelingIsrael/AboutIsrael/Pages/aliya1.aspx


26 “The Balfour Declaration represented the convinced policy of all parties in our country and also in America, but the launching of it in 1917 was due, as I have said, to propagandist reasons. I should like once more to remind the British public, who may be hesitating about the burdens of our Zionist Declaration to-day, of the actual war position at the time of that Declaration. We are now looking at the War through the dazzling glow of a triumphant end, but in 1917 the issue of the War was still very much in doubt. We were convinced - but not all of us - that we would pull through victoriously, but the Germans were equally persuaded that victory would rest on their banners, and they had much reason for coming to that conclusion. They had smashed the Roumanians. The Russian Army was completely demoralised by its numerous defeats. The French Army was exhausted and temporarily unequal to striking a great blow. The Italians had sustained a shattering defeat at Caporetto. The unlimited submarine campaign had sunk millions of tons of our shipping. There were no American divisions at the front, and when I say at the front, I mean available in the trenches. For the Allies there were two paramount problems at that time. The first was that the Central Powers should be broken by the blockade before our supplies of food and essential raw material were cut off by sinkings of our own ships. The other was that the war preparations in the United States should be speeded up to such an extent as to enable the Allies to be adequately reinforced in the critical campaign of 1918 by American troops. In the solution of these two problems, public opinion in Russia and America played a great part, and we had every reason at that time to believe that in both countries the friendliness or hostility of the Jewish race might make a considerable difference.” David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, Volume II, New Haven, Yale University Press 1939; (Ch. XXIII), p 723. [Emphasis supplied].

27 William Ormsby-Gore (also the British representative to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations from 1921 to 1922.), describing from memory the events leading to the declaration, noted: ‘The value of the declaration received remarkable tribute from General Ludendorff.... The S of S [Secretary of State] should have a statement
showing similar declarations by other powers up to and including the recent one of the American Senate. I wrote an article on the question in the XIXth Century about 2 years ago which has some interesting data. WOG 24/12/1922. From the Balfour Project The Balfour Declaration – Key players and events by Mary Grey. http://www.balfourproject.org/the-balfour-declaration-key-players-and-events-by-mary-grey.

28 As an illustration [of the propaganda strategy for mobilizing global opinion and force] Lloyd George said: “I might take the public declarations we made of the Allied intention to liberate and confer self-government on nationalities inside the enemy Empires, - Turkey, Germany, and Austria. These announcements were intended to have a propagandist effect, not only at home, but also in neutral countries and perhaps most of all in enemy countries.” David Lloyd George, British Prime Minister, on the negotiations with Rothschild and the Zionist leadership, prior to the Balfour Declaration. Excerpt from Lloyd George’s “Memoirs of the Peace Conference:From “Sharing the Land of Canaan,” http://qumsiyeh.org/balfourdeclaration.

29 It must be noted that David Lloyd George also stated that he supported the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine because “it would help secure post-war British control of Palestine, which was strategically important as a buffer to Egypt and the Suez Canal.”

30 The War Cabinet undertook the supreme direction of the war effort. It was composed of David Lloyd George, the Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour now Foreign Secretary replacing Edward Grey, Andrew Bonar Law, Lord Nathaniel Curzon, Alfred Milner, Arthur Henderson and Sir Maurice Hankey (its Secretary). Mark Sykes and Leopold Amery were also secretaries. See The Balfour Project The Balfour Declaration – Key players and events by Mary Grey http://www.balfourproject.org/the-balfour-declaration-key-players-and-events-by-mary-grey.

31 Weizmann was credited later with persuading Balfour, then the Foreign Minister, for British support to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine, the original Zionist demand: “We [the Jewish people] have never based the Zionist movement on Jewish suffering in Russia or in any other land. .... suffering have never been the mainspring of Zionism. The foundation of Zionism was, and continues to be to this day, the yearning of the Jewish people for its homeland, for a national center and a national life.”

32 The success of British propaganda methods were acknowledged by a German soldier of the time when he dictated his memoirs, Mein Kampf, in 1925: "In England propaganda was regarded as a weapon of the first order, whereas with us it represented the last hope of a livelihood for our unemployed politicians and a snug job for shirkers of the modest heroic type. Taken all in all, its results were negative." Robert John, “Behind the Balfour Declaration,” The Journal of Historical Review, Winter,1985-6 (Vol. 6, No. 4), pages 389-450, 498. This paper was first presented in1983 and also the basis for the booklet, Behind the Balfour Declaration: The Hidden Origin of Today’s Mideast Crisis, published by the Institute for Historical Review in 1988.

33 Samuel Landman, “Great Britain, The Jews and Palestine,” written under the auspices of the Zionist Association, March 1936, quoting Mr. Wickham Steed, who says General
Ludendorff is alleged to have said after the War that: "The Balfour Declaration was the cleverest thing done by the Allies in the way of propaganda, and that he wished Germany had thought of it first" (vol. 2, p. 392). "As a matter of fact," says Landman, that "this was said by Ludendorff to Sir Alfred Mond (afterwards Lord Melchett), soon after the War. The fact that it was Jewish help that brought USA into the War on the side of the Allies has ranked ever since in German – especially Nazi – minds, and has contributed in no small measure to the prominence which anti-Semitism occupies in the Nazi programme."


34 Both Lord Curzon and Edwin Montagu were against the declaration. Curzon, (First Marquess Curzon of Kedleston) 1859-1925, a conservative politician, formerly viceroy of India from 1898-1905 joined Asquith's government in 1915. Invited by Lloyd George to join his government in 1916, he was also invited to join the (select) War Cabinet where he served as lord president of the council. After the war Curzon replaced Balfour as Foreign Secretary and served until the Labor victory in the general election of 1923. Curzon was strongly opposed to Zionist aims in Palestine and argued that Jewish immigrants would not be able to establish a homeland there without expelling the indigenous Arabs. See The Balfour Project, supra.

35 The great majority of British Jews were “assimilationist” and therefore anti-Zionist. Led by Lucien Wolf, who came to dominate the Conjoint Committee of the Anglo-Jewish Association and the Board of Deputies of British Jews, Wolf and his colleagues (especially Claude Montefiore and Edwin Montagu) worked tirelessly to influence British policy against establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Their position denied the existence of Jewish nationality, and they sought assistance from Britain to ensure the rights of Jews in whatever country they lived. They also wanted Britain to pursue a separate peace with the Ottomans. Jonathan Schneer http://mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/balfour-declaration http://mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/balfour-declaration.

36 The Times reported on 14 April 1911, of the Zionist organ Jeune Turc's "violent hostility to England" and "its germanophile enthusiasm," and the propaganda carried on among Turkish Jews by "German Zionist agents." The concern of the majority of rich English Jews was not allayed by articles in the Jewish Chronicle, edited by Leopold Greenberg, which pointed out that in the Basle program there was "not a word of any autonomous Jewish state." In Die Welt, the official organ of the Movement, an article by Nahum Sokolow, then the General Secretary of the Zionist Organization, protested that there was no truth in the allegation that Zionism aimed at the establishment of an independent Jewish State.
37 These included Edwin Montagu (1879-1924) who was a Jewish anti-Zionist and liberal politician with close ties to Asquith. He earned the latter's enmity by joining the Lloyd George coalition government and led the opposition in the Cabinet to the Balfour Declaration: his view was that he had spent his life as a British citizen and did not want to return to a "Jewish Ghetto". But just before the Cabinet came to a final decision, he had to leave the country to take up a post as Secretary of State for India. See the Balfour Project, “The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict”, supra.

38 Even at the 11th Congress in 1913, Otto Warburg, speaking as chairman of the Zionist Executive, gave assurances of loyalty to Turkey, adding that in colonizing Palestine and developing its resources, Zionists would be making a valuable contribution to the progress of the Turkish Empire.

39 Robert John writes “Of the Warburg international banking family.... Although ostensibly a second Secretary in the Wilhelmstrasse, Warburg has been reported as having the same position in German counterintelligence as Admiral Canaris in World War II.... Jacob Schiff, German-born senior partner in Kuhn, Loeb & Co. and "the most influential figure of his day in American Jewish life," wrote in The Menorah Journal of April 1915: "It is well known that I am a German sympathizer ... England has been contaminated by her alliance with Russia ... am quite convinced that in Germany anti-Semitism is a thing of the past. Robert John, “Behind the Balfour Declaration: The Hidden Origin of Today’s Mideast Crisis,” The Journal of Historical Review, Winter 1985-6 (Vol. 6, No. 4), pages 389-450, 498. This paper was first presented by the author at the Fifth IHR Conference, 1983. It was also the basis for the booklet, Behind the Balfour Declaration.

40 The Jewish Encyclopedia for 1906 states that "Schiff’s firm subscribed for and floated the large Japanese war loan in 1904-05" (for the Russo-Japanese war). "in recognition of which the Mikado conferred on Schiff the second order of the Sacred Treasure of Japan." Partners with Schiff were Felix M. Warburg and his brother Paul who had come to New York in 1902 from Hamburg, and organized the Federal Reserve System.

41 In “The Future of Palestine,” (a memorandum drafted by Lord Herbert Samuel in November and presented to the British Cabinet in January and March of 1915, two months after the British declared war on the Ottoman Empire), “Lord Samuel stated that "I am assured that the solution of the problem of Palestine which would be much the most welcome to the leaders and supporters of the Zionist movement throughout the world would be the annexation of the country to the British Empire.”

42 In late 1905 Charles Dreyfus arranged for Weizmann to meet Balfour, his Jewish constituency representative, during which Weizmann asked for official British support for Zionism; they were to meet again on this issue in 1914.


45 The terms were also discussed at the San Remo Peace Conference of 1920 at which passed regarding the mandates of the League of Nations for administration of the former Ottoman-ruled -ruled lands in the Middle East. The precise boundaries of all territories were left unspecified, to "be determined by the Principal Allied Powers." These were not finalized until four years later.


47 In 1939, Great Britain issued a white paper, essentially reneging on the original declaration, and stating that a Jewish homeland was no longer a priority. Immigration to Palestine was severely restricted, and because of this, many Jews were unable to flee the persecution taking place in eastern and central Europe. Despite this, the Balfour Declaration laid a solid foundation for realizing the Zionist dream, becoming the first officially sanctioned step toward what would eventually become the Jewish state.

48 Not only were some American Jews reluctant to accept the notion of Palestine being under British dominion, but notable Israelis had problems as well. These included David Ben Gurion, who favored Ottoman control – in no small measure because he spent several years in Turkey, earning his law degree at the University of Istanbul.

49 It should be noted that initially, the Germans reached the same conclusion as the British, that creation of a Jewish State would avail them of the resources of American Jewry and American political support. See footnote 26 and footnote 30.

50 In the form of a memorandum prepared by Herbert Samuel between November, 1914 and January 1915, submitted and then circulated on January 28 and then revised and re-circulated in March.

51 from "The Balfour Project, The Balfour Declaration – Key players and events by Mary Grey.


53 In the appendix, I will superficially address the importance of Lord Samuel’s contribution, leaving it to historians to embellish further.

54 Other Americans were also interested in the ‘Jewish problem’ including Louis Brandeis, and Felix Frankfurther as early as August 30, 1914. At a conference in New York on 30 August 1914, a committee was set up under the chairmanship of Louis D. Brandeis, with the British-born Dr. Richard Gottheil and Jacob de Haas, Rabbi Stephen Wise and Felix
Frankfurter, among his principal lieutenants. For Shmarya Levin, the representative of the
Zionist Executive in the United States, and Dr. Judah Magnes, to whom the alliance of
England and France with Russia seemed "unholy," Russian czarism was the enemy against
which their force should be pitted. But on 1 October 1914 Gottheil, first President of the
Zionist Organization of America, wrote from the Department of Semitic Languages,
Columbia University, to Brandeis in Boston enclosing a memorandum on what the
organization planned to seek from the belligerents, with respect to the Russian Jews: 'We
have got to be prepared to work under the Government of any one of the Powers ... shall be
glad to have any suggestion from you in regard to this memorandum, and shall be glad to
know if it meets with your approval. I recognize that I ought not to have put it out without
first consulting you; but the exigencies of the situation demanded immediate action. We
ought to be fully prepared to take advantage of any occasion that offers itself.[49]" In fact,
the American Zionists were far more advanced in coordinating a platform, organizing a
program, collecting funds, and administering a budget. At this time, the British Zionists
were not even in a state of cohesion, let alone unanimity of opinions, even within the ranks
of the Zionists.' ihr.org.

55 including Nordau, Zangwil and Pinsker according to Benzion Netanyahu, “The Founding

56 Department of Organic Chemistry, Weizmann Institute of Science
http://www.weizmann.ac.il/Organic_Chemistry/weizlab.shtml

57 The British company, Nobel Explosives of Glasgow, was the main producer of the
smokeless powder, cordite, and began to expand its facilities almost immediately. In
Germany, as Johnson recounts, the head of the German Nobel component, Gustav
Aufschläger, was almost immediately made head of the country's War Chemicals
Corporation, on 30 September 1914.17

SEYMOUR MAUSKOPF REVISITING THE 'CHEMISTS' WAR', 1914–1923: MODERN
WAR, MUNITIONS, AND NATIONAL SYSTEMS Springer publications.

58 He was Munitions Minister from May 25, 1915 to July 9, 1916. Prior to that he was
Chancellor of the Exchequer; following his stint as Munitions Minister, he was Minister of
War (with little power) until he resigned on December 5. On December 7, after Alfred
Bonar Law was unable to put together a coalition, he became Prime Minister.

59 In early 1916, according to Ormsby-Gore, “Dr Weizmann was then unknown.” [emphasis
supplied]. From “Britain in Palestine Britain’s historic responsibilities for the Israel-
Palestine conflict:Starting an honest conversation,” a Power Point presentation from The
Balfour Project, supra.

60 National Archives of Britain. See also www.jstor.org/stable/568236 by Jehuda Reinharz -
1985 “Science in the service of politics: the case of Chaim Weizmann during the First World
Some references say it was 1904. http://www.chemistryexplained.com/Va-Z/Weizmann-Chaim.html

Reinharz, in the most authoritative [and incredibly well-researched article on the subject, see note 58] places the date sometime in 1914. (see footnote 58) A more precise chronology of events based on Reinharz research and corroborated by letters in the National Archives of Great Britain and other sources is found in Appendix 3.

In 1912 Weizmann discovered that that the bacterium *Clostridium acetobutylicum* converted starch to a mixture of ethanol, acetone, and butyl alcohol. Michael Sutton, “Moulder of Molecules: Maker of a Nation,” http://www.chemistry.org.il/booklet/12/pdf/weizmann.pdf. Sutton’s date is contradicted in both Weizmann’s patent application (for which he first applied in March of 1915) and Reinharz’ article. It appears that in 1912 Weizmann was working on a similar process using a different organism discovered by a Dr Fernbach which was to be used on potatoes. Only because that process was a disappointing failure, was Weizmann’s discovery so valued.


Weizmann applied for a [provisional] British patent in March 1915 and a US patent under the name Charles Weizmann in 1916. He was granted US patent 1315585A in 1919.

Cordite had been used by the British military since 1889, when it first replaced black gunpowder. It consisted chiefly of the high-explosives nitroglycerine and nitrocellulose (gun-cotton), with acetone playing the key role of solvent in the manufacturing process.

See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mvZ3Ia5gPbo for an excellent video on the history of construction of the Royal Naval Cordite Factory in Dorset built under Churchill’s direction for Weizmann’s work on acetone.


Saul David, “Bullets, Boots and Bandages: How to Really Win at War - How Germany Lost the WWI Arms race,” 16 February 2012. Saul David is Professor of War Studies at the University of Birmingham.

http://www.firstworldwar.com/atoz/shellscandal.htm The Shell Crisis of 1915: “David Lloyd George, the Liberal Chancellor, fervently believed that a radical improvement to the munitions industry was not only possible but thoroughly necessary if the British were to compete with Germany in a long war. He did not however believe that the war secretary, Lord Kitchener, under whom responsibility for munitions production fell, was up to the task of delivering the required production overhaul. Lloyd George therefore encouraged the proprietor of the powerful Times and Daily Mail newspapers, Lord Northcliffe, in the latter’s determination to publish details of the ‘shell scandal’ in his newspapers. Northcliffe duly published an article by Repington on 14 May 1915 claiming that the fault of the matter lay with the War Office and in particular with Lord Kitchener. The resultant uproar was not restricted to the political elite.”

Northcliffe also helped bring about Lloyd George’s appointment as Prime Minister in 1916. In return Lloyd George offered Northcliffe a post in his cabinet, but Northcliffe declined. Instead he accepted the post of Director for Propaganda.

In February, Lloyd George began a series of pronouncements on the subject, going so far as to say in a speech to his constituents in Bangor on February 28 that “we are conducting a war as if there was no war”. The speech was printed in The Times the following day.


The Battle of Neuve Chapelle, 1915, first worldwar.com

According to the historian Martin Gilbert per “The Battle of Neuve Chapelle,” http://www.firstworldwar-history.co.uk/page-2.php
Notwithstanding the auspicious beginnings of the attack, the operation did not end well. While the British recaptured about 2 km (1.2 mi) of ground, almost 11,000 British and Indians were killed, about 25% of the troops deployed. The planned British offensive was postponed on March 13 and abandoned two days later.

Several factors must be noted in considering the intensity of Lord Northcliffe’s activities. 1. The recent death in action of his nephew at Neuve Chappelle. 2. The over-zealousness of his actions prompted Lloyd George had to warn Northcliffe that the campaign was counterproductive and creating sympathy for Kitchener who at that point was considered a national hero. http://www.firstworldwar.com/bio/northcliffe.htm who’s who. Lord Northcliffe


Ibid.

As Lloyd George wrote in his memoirs: “Human valour is no shield against high explosives or machine-gun bullets. It soon became evident to clear eyes and gradually to the most obtuse vision that the war would be fought and ultimately decided in the workshop and the laboratory.” Vol. 2, p. 75.

“Kitchener had tried to persuade the army to be economical in its use of shells, as well as diverting some of the much-needed munitions to the Dardanelles. The result was that the preliminary bombardments which the British could deploy to break down German defences [sic] before launching an assault used far fewer shells than the French and were much less effective.” http://www.cercles.com/n21/parsons.pdf


The Battle of Abers http://www.1914-1918.net/bat11.htm

The Times headline of May 14 did not miss the opportunity to lambast the government. The headline blared: “Need for shells: British attacks checked: Limited supply the cause: A Lesson From France” It commented "We had not sufficient high explosives to lower the enemy’s parapets to the ground ... The want of an unlimited supply of high explosives was a fatal bar to our success," clearly putting the onus on the government.

NEED FOR SHELLS, the Times headline blared on May 14, picking up on French’s claims. BRITISH ATTACKS CHECKED — LIMITED SUPPLIES THE CAUSE. The article quoted French and stated that The attacks [at Abers Ridge] were well planned and valiantly conducted. The infantry did splendidly, but the conditions were too hard. The want of an unlimited supply of high explosives was a fatal bar to our success. Though French’s claims
contradicted earlier statements made by Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, in a speech to munitions workers in Newcastle, they nonetheless set off a full-blown crisis and Asquith's Liberal government, already under fire for its unsuccessful naval policy in the Dardanelles—in protest of which First Sea Lord John Arbuthnot, Jackie Fisher, the man who had rebuilt the British navy in the years before the war and introduced the famous Dreadnought battleship, resigned on May 15—was forced to accept the formation of a coalition cabinet.

91 This Week in History, May 14 - May 20 May 14, 1916 London Times article sparks "Shells Crisis” See also A day in history.com
96 Beginning in 1914, Weizmann began searching for a conduit to Lloyd George and Balfour. One potential vehicle was C.P. Scott, Editor of the Manchester Guardian. Scott did further Weizmann and Zionism’s prestige and a rather romanticized view of his contribution based primarily on Scott’s own account can be found in, Cillian Stephen Doyle (BA) “Adopting Zionism as a liberal cause: C.P. Scott, the Manchester Guardian and the Zionist movement, 1914-1932,” http://www.ucd.ie/ibp/MADissertations2009/DoyleKillian.pdf.
97 Among Weizmann’s friends in the intellectual Jewish Community in Manchester was a Journalist on the Manchester Guardian, Harry Sacher, although it appears that Sacher was not the one responsible for arranging the meeting between Weizmann and Scott, but rather the meeting came through a social tea via one of Vera Weizmann’s acquaintances. Impressed by Weizmann’s charm Scott attempted to introduce him and the Zionist ideal to Lloyd George with whom Scott was meeting regularly in 1914 (see appendix). The attempted introduction did not pan out and it remained for Weizmann to meet Lloyd George through his scientific prowess and accomplishments the following year. Even here, his own initiative and contacts did not pay off. His response to a War Office request for scientists to contribute relevant efforts was rebuffed and it remained for Sir Fredrick
Nathan, an expert on munitions on the staff of Winston Churchill to seek Weizmann out the following year. (See footnote 83.)

98 Sir Fredrick Nathan was an English soldier and chemist. He joined the Royal Artillery in 1879. He became an explosives expert and during World War I organized munitions manufacture. He was president of the Institution of Chemical Engineers from 1925 to 1927. From 1905 to 1926 he served as commandant of the Jewish Lads' Brigade. Blackwell Reference online. http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9780631187288_chunk_g9780631187288_3118728819_ss1-54


100 Per Reinhartz, Nathan was made aware of Weizmann's process in February of 1915. See Appendix 3 for a more precise chronology of the timing of events.

101 Clostridia is the genus of rod-shaped bacteria that include organisms that utilize anaerobic (without air) processes. Rod shaped organisms that require air are called bacilli (see note 100)

102 According to Weizmann biographer Norman Rose, “When turned loose on a mash of corn, bacillus B-Y caused it to ferment rapidly producing a solution that contained butanol, acetone, and minor quantities of ethyl alcohol...These solvents could then be separated in pure form by a relatively simple process of distillation.”

103 “Acetone had previously been made from calcium acetate imported from Germany. Since importation of the German calcium acetate was not possible and the United States did not have a large supply, Weizmann was recruited by Winston Churchill and the British government to set up his microbial fermentation for the production of acetone from corn at the Nicholson Distillery in London. The grain supply was unreliable, however, because of the German blockade and it was necessary to look for a different fermentable carbohydrate. Food was being rationed so a substrate that could not be used for human food was needed. In 1916, Weizmann even tried to use horse chestnuts collected by children, but the supply was insufficient for a large-scale fermentation. The British turned to other parts of the British Empire and to their allies for a fermentable carbohydrate. Consequently, in 1916, the Weizmann process was moved to a distillery in Toronto (Canada) and another was built in India. In 1917, a plant was set up to ferment corn in Indiana (U.S.).” Christine Case, Ed.D. Microbiology Professor, Skyline College “Microbial Fermentations: Changed The Course Of Human History” http://www.accessexcellence.org/LC/SS/ferm_background.php

105 Letter of Ch. Weizmann, Admiralty Laboratories, Lister Institute of Preventive Medicine, Chelsea Gardens, London, S.W., to Mr. Davies. **LG/D/10/1/19** 6 March 1915 held in the UK Parliamentary Archives: Weizmann “Asks for endorsed to be given to Lloyd George. Enclosure: Ch. Weizmann, Admiralty Laboratories, to (Rt. Hon. Lloyd George) Typescript 6 March 1915, [this must be a typographical error because Weizmann was not posted to the Lister Institute until 1916] Submits, as requested the previous Friday, the results of the experiments on the use of butyl alcohol for obtaining acetone. Says there is "reasonable chance of success" judging from this preliminary investigation.” http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/A2A/records.aspx?cat=061-lg_4-1&cid=1-10-1-10#1-10-1-10.

106 “In August 1914, Weizmann writes, he found a circular on his desk from the War Office, inviting scientists to report any discovery of military value. Perhaps, Weizmann thought, I can ‘ferment’ acetone. Weizmann offered the War Office his fermentation processes. There was no response until he was sought out by and advisor on Churchill’s staff. In 1915, according to Weizmann’s autobiography “**Trial and Error,**” he was summoned to meet with the First Lord of the Admiralty -- a young energetic statesman named Winston Churchill. Churchill’s first words were, “Well, Dr. Weizmann, we need thirty thousand tons of acetone. Can you make it?” Churchill was especially keen on finding alternatives to acetone production in light of Kitchener’s insistence that alternatives for acetone be found all the while Kitchener curtailed its use. (see UK Munitions archives).

107 Kiel Majewski Terre Haute And WWI http://digital.terrehauteliving.com/article/Terre_Haute_And_WWI/639721/61187/article.html


109 A letter from “Chaim Weizmann, 41 Campden House Road, Kensington, Winston Churchill, to Sir Frederick [Black] **LG/D/10/1/18, 27 Feb 1916** describes how the Admiralty sponsored his acetone process as early as **April,** 1915 and appointed him, 1st Sep 1915, as temporary honorary Technical Advisor on acetone supplies. Weizmann notes that the Ministry of Munitions only became interested in him in **August,** 1915 and appointed him, in Sep 1915, Chemical Advisor on Acetone Supplies. Thinks his position not sufficiently regularised. Stresses the importance of his process.” [sic] http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/A2A/records.aspx?cat=061-lg_4-1&cid=1-10-1-10#1-10-1-10 This letter casts grave doubt on the claims of CP Scott (of the Manchester Guardian) to have engineered Weizmann’s appointment by the Ministry of Munitions. It appears it was not CP Scott, but Churchill who introduced Weizmann to Lloyd George, as in fact Lloyd George’s own records attest. It also indicates that rather than Weizmann’s personality and zeal in promoting Zionism, it was his scientific accomplishments that initially were of interest to Lloyd George.
The Shell Crisis also contributed to the failed naval attack on the Dardanelles and Admiral Fisher’s resignation.

By this time it appears from Lloyd George’s notes that he was already keenly aware of and involved with Weizmann’s scientific pursuits. Weizmann has been in contact with Mr Davies of his office since March of 1915. “Ch. Weizmann, Admiralty Laboratories, to Mr. Davies. LG/D/10/1/21, 25 May 1916 Enclosure: Ch. Weizmann, Admiralty Laboratories, to (Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George). Typescript 25 May 1916 which refers to their interview that morning and states that he is proceeding with arrangements for continuing the experiments for the conversion of ordinary spirits into benzene and toluene and therefore into picric acid.”

“To London by night train primarily to see Lloyd George about munitions. Weizmann having achieved complete success in large scale production of acetone, essential ingredient for cordite (projectile), eager to push on with experiments in production of toluol essential for high explosives. Some expense involved. Lord Moulton obstructive … Lloyd George keenly interested … and promised to act.” C. P. Scott: diary for 27/28 January 1916.

“Report on Weizmann acetone process carried out at Royal Naval Cordite Factory, Poole, Dorset, Ministry of Munitions: Files transferred to the War Office. Department of Explosives Supply. Acetone Supplies, Experiments, etc. Report on Weizmann acetone process carried out at Royal Naval Cordite Factory, Poole, Dorset Collection: Records of the Ministry of Munitions and successors, including papers of David Lloyd George. Date range: 20 December 1915 - 20 December 1915 Reference: MUN 7/238Subjects: Armed Forces (General), Manufacturing, Weapons, Army, Navy.” Files transferred to the War Office.

“Bazire, Dept. of Explosives Supplies, to Davies. LG/D/10/1/20 13 May 1916” Lord Moulton has approved of the Acetone Memo. Enclosure: (a) Minute from Moulton.
Typescript 13 May 1916. The progress of Weizmann’s research. (b) Two Memos. by F.L.Nathan. Typescript 12 May 1916. The production of acetone by the Weizmann Process and the provision of experimental plant.” Lord Moulton was another example of the scientist statesman. A Fellow of the Royal Society, Moulton was a mathematician, lawyer and judge. He was awarded the French Legion of Honour for his work in establishing international co-operation in terms of the measurement of electrical quantities. In 1914 he became chairman of a committee to advise on the supply of explosives eventually becoming Director-General of the Explosives Department of the War Office where he personally visited every munitions factory.

About 90,000 gallons

“Reports by Dr. Charles [sic] Weizmann on experiments in production of acetone Ministry of Munitions: Files transferred to the War Office. Department of Explosives Supply. Acetone Supplies, Experiments, etc. Reports by Dr. Charles [sic] Weizmann on experiments in production of acetone. Collection: Records of the Ministry of Munitions and successors, including papers of David Lloyd George Date range: 23 September 1915 - 01
July 1916 Reference: MUN 7/236
Subjects: Armed Forces (General), Weapons, Army,” from the British Archives files - papers of Lloyd George.[sometimes Weizmann used the name ‘Charles’, which is also found on his 1919 patent application in the U.S.]/

116 Report on Weizmann acetone process carried out at Royal Naval Cordite Factory, Poole, Dorset Ministry of Munitions: Files transferred to the War Office. Department of Explosives Supply. Acetone Supplies, Experiments, etc. Report on Weizmann acetone process carried out at Royal Naval Cordite Factory, Poole, Dorset. Collection: Records of the Ministry of Munitions and successors, including papers of David Lloyd GeorgeDate range: 20 December 1915 - 20 December 1915 Reference: MUN 7/238 Subjects: Armed Forces (General), Manufacturing, Weapons, Army, Navy,” from the British Archives, from the British Archives files - papers of Lloyd George.

117 Britain tried to run the fermentation process on an industrial scale at various plants around the United Kingdom, to no avail due to grain shortages. When the United States entered the war in 1917, Britain decided to try the process where the corn was plentiful and the distilleries were in full effect. The United States Air Service and the British War Mission purchased the Commercial and Majestic whiskey distilleries on the Wabash River in Terre Haute and adapted them for acetone production by the Weizmann process. According to Frances Hughes of the Terre Haute Spectator, between May of 1918 and Armistice Day 1.5 million gallons of acetone were produced for the war effort in Terre Haute, Indiana.

http://books.google.co.il/books?id=PsabNtx33VMC&pg=PA654&lpg=PA654&dq=weizmann+rubber&source=bl&ots=PAhQZEnhVq&sig=kuxlRCzahMSCgyp_g06RYQhZKEg&hl=en&sa=X&ei=dI13UpHLBobbsgbAiYHgAg&ved=0CGEQ6AEwBw#v=snippet&q=weizmann%20lloyd%20george&f=false.

118 The National Archives of Lloyd George correspondences indicate a rather less grand position, “Chemical Advisor on Acetone Supplies.” See appendix 3.

119 In May of 1916, a lead article in the Times of London proclaims that an insufficiency of munitions is leading to defeat for Britain on the battlefields of World War I. The article sparked a genuine crisis on the home front, forcing the Liberal government to give way to a coalition and prompting the creation of a Ministry of Munitions.

120 He also created a War Cabinet which undertook the supreme direction of the war effort. It was composed of David Lloyd George, the Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour, now Foreign Secretary, replacing Edward Grey, Andrew Bonar Law, Lord Nathaniel Curzon, Alfred Milner, Arthur Henderson and Sir Maurice Hankey (its Secretary). Mark Sykes and Leopold Amery were also secretaries. http://www.balfourproject.org/the-balfour-declaration-key-players-and-events-by-mary-grey.

121 The date of Weizmann’s first meeting with Lloyd George is hotly contested. Most of his biographers, as well as his patron, CP Scott of the Manchester Guardian, place the date of the first meeting in December of 1914 or January of 1915 (Sanders) based on a rambling note written years later in Weizmann’s memoirs and an undated letter from Weizmann to Scott, ostensibly written in 1914. This meeting – which all sources claiming this date agree
included Lord Samuel, CP Scott, Weizmann, Lloyd George and Josiah Wedgwood never seemed to have occurred at all. Wedgewood first met Weizmann in December of 1916! And while Wedgwood later became an ardent champion of Zionism, in January of 1915 – there is not one shred of evidence supporting the notion that the MP from Newcastle had any Zionist inclination at all. Wedgwood’s recollection confirms the position of Lloyd George (supported by records from the National archives) indicating Weizmann met Lloyd George in August of 1915- incident to his hiring regarding developing acetone by his method for use by the Ministry of Munitions. The first time that Lloyd George discussed Zionism – at least to any degree of substance—did not occur until November of 1915 – shortly after the first successful mass production of acetone occurred.

122 David Lloyd George, Memoirs, *supra*.
123 The Balfour Project, *supra*.
124 Charles D. Smith, in *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Bedford/St. Martin’s (), pp. 68-83. argues that Weizmann’s effective lobbying was largely responsible for developing British willingness to issue the Balfour Declaration. However, “it would not have come about without the blending of Weizmann’s arguments regarding the value of Zionism to British interests with the emergence of events that seemed to prove him right.”
125 Segev, p.41. From *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann. From the Balfour Project*
127 Indeed, Balfour prides himself on his purely Zionist intentions and motivations. In his introduction to Nahum Sokolow’s “History of Zionism,” Balfour makes it clear that he supported the project of a "national home" for the Jewish people because he believed it was just.”
128 Lloyd George may claim credit for introducing Weizmann to Balfour but Weizmann had met Balfour years previously. It is perhaps the re-introduction following Weizmann’s discovery of acetone to which Lloyd George refers.
129 David Lloyd George, “*Memoirs of the Peace Conference, Volume II,*” New Haven, Yale University Press 1939; (Ch. XXIII).
131 Although the time lag between the inception of events and its fruition hints to the involvement of another influence, to be discussed in the companion article.
133 http://www.thenagain.info/webchron/middleeast/Balfour.html
In fact because of what Lloyd George wrote in his autobiography, may people believe the Balfour declaration was a reward for Weizmann’s work in biochemistry for the Admiralty. See Mary Grey, “Chaim Weizmann (1874-1952), The Balfour Project.” This Weizmann himself rejects, saying “I almost wish it had been as simple as that, and that I had never known the heartbeat, the drudgery which preceded the Declaration. But history does not deal in Aladdin’s lamps.” Weizmann, “Trial and Error, "Hamish Hamilton, London 1949.

Bernard Wasserstein in “Vision Confronts Reality: Historical Perspectives on the Contemporary Jewish Agenda. edited by Ruth Kozodoy, David Sidorsky, Kalman Sultanik, Associated Universities Press,, Herzl Press, New York, Jan 1, 1989 citing Richard Crossman ( a id of Weizmann’s) who attributed Weizmann’s scientific discoveries as providing the much needed access to Lloyd George through which Weizmann was able to put forward the Zionist agenda. See p.178.

“Current Biography 1942,” pp. 877–80. The story goes that Weizmann asked Balfour, "Would you give up London to live in Saskatchewan?" When Balfour replied that the British had always lived in London, Weizmann responded, "Yes, and we lived in Jerusalem when London was still a marsh."

Smuts later became Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.


According to Mary Grey of the Balfour Project: “It was Lloyd Geogemimister of munitions, who introduced him to Balfour. 1912 citing Biography: Arthur Balfour 1848- 1930

“Some authors (for example, Bernard Wasserstein in this article) think this was the first time that Herbert Samuel and Chaim Weizmann met, but on page 150 of his memoirs Weizmann says they met on 3 December 1914, at a breakfast with David Lloyd George, C P Scott and Josiah Wedgwood.” From the PWIP data base.

Reinharz.

Ibid. Prof. Meyir Verite suggests that most of the credit belongs to Herbert Samuel and Nahum Sakolow.
If, as history seems to confirm, Samuel was working on a manifesto supporting the notion of a Jewish homeland as early as November 1914 (to be sure with input by Weizmann – who Samuel believed was in fact too tame with his demands) then Samuel deserves more credit than he is traditionally given.

In fact, Samuel submitted his manifesto to the Cabinet (on January 28, 1915).

See also “Introduction – what motivated the Balfour Declaration? Key players and events: Mary Grey,” The Balfour Project, supra.


Later that year, on July 12th, Nahum Sokolow wrote a tentative draft of the declaration[1] and sent it, and some explanatory comments to Lord Rothschild, the head of the Zionist Federation in Great Britain. Sokolow also sent the draft to Sir Mark Sykes and Sir Ronald Graham.

Donald Neff, *Fallen Pillars, U.S. Policy towards Palestine and Israel since 1945,* Chapter One: Zionism: Jewish Americans and the State Department, 1897-1945, Institute for Palestine Studies, 2002.

Weizmann and Brandeis did not meet face to face until 1919 and their relationship appeared frosty from the outset, notwithstanding the collaboration and cooperation between the two men during the later months of 1917. In June, 1919, on his way to Palestine Brandeis stopped for a short time in London where he met Weizmann for the first time. In a letter to his wife, Brandeis wrote that Weizmann "is neither as great nor as objectionable as he was painted. But he is very " much of a man and much bigger than most of his fellows". Weizmann in his *Trial and Error* describes Brandeis as "upright, austere, of a scrupulous honesty and implacable logic".

Colonel Josiah Clement Wedgwood (1872-1943), MP, was one of Vladimir (Ze'ev) Jabotinsky's strongest backers and his colleague in the Seventh Dominion League. In 1928, Wedgwood published a book, *The Seventh Dominion*, calling for Palestine to become a Jewish Dominion within the British Empire. Having returned to England, Wedgwood was elected as Member of Parliament (MP) for Newcastle-under-Lyme at the 1906 general election. Though he stood for the Liberal Party, he made it clear that he would take an independent line in Parliament if necessary, in accordance with his conscience. He was re-elected at both elections in 1910, and that year was also elected to Staffordshire County Council. His interest in Zionism was not known until late 1916 at the earliest.  

153 Ibid p. 73

154 Sanders.


156 “The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann: August 1898-July 1931.”


162 Linda Marie S. Aidan, “Beliefs And Policymaking in the Middle East: Analysis of the Israeli Right.”XLibris corp. p 51

163 Ibid

164 Ibid.

November 14, 2013 November 19.2013